QAV 508 

Cameron  00:02

Wel­come to QAV 508, TK. Are you doing bet­ter with age? Your t‑shirt says

Tony  00:11

I’ve got my Mur­ray Broth­ers’ Bour­bon t‑shirt on. “It’s bet­ter with age,” exact­ly.

Cameron  00:19

Your last day down at Cape Schanck today?

Tony  00:22

Yes, I’ll leave tomor­row morn­ing. Back in Syd­ney on the week­end.

Cameron  00:26

Oh, that’s good.

Tony  00:28

I don’t know, Syd­ney’s cop­ping the rain at the moment, too.

Cameron  00:31

Oh, yeah. Yeah.

Tony  00:32

So I’m not sure its worth going back to but yeah, I need to get back.

Cameron  00:34

Might have to take a pud­dle — not pud­dle, a pad­dle, a pad­dle for the pud­dle on your way. Well, it’s been a big week in the mar­kets, in the world, we’ve got a lot to cov­er. And then I need to edit the show myself this week because my nor­mal edi­tor of this show for the last four or five months, Den­nis, lives in Kharkiv, in Ukraine. And he has, as peo­ple who are in ou Face­book group, or might fol­low me on Face­book any­way, might know I’ve post­ed an email I got from him. He’s obvi­ous­ly gone under­ground and said prob­a­bly won’t be able to work for you for a while. So, I guess the most inter­est­ing thing out­side of the ins and outs of what’s going on over there is, for us as investors, is the way the mar­ket han­dled it. The day before the inva­sion the mar­kets tanked and the day of the inva­sion they turned back up, and it’s been sort of boom days for the last cou­ple of days. Lots of growth across the board, a lot of our stocks are doing well, mar­kets in gen­er­al seem to be han­dling it fair­ly well. I read a num­ber of dif­fer­ent analy­ses on why the mar­ket picked up on the day of the inva­sion, like the biggest inva­sion in prob­a­bly, at least in that part of the world, since World War II. Noth­ing that I read real­ly con­vinced me that any­one who was writ­ing these arti­cles real­ly had a clue about what was going on. I read stuff in Chan­ti­cleer about inter­est rates, I read some­body else quot­ing Roth­schild “buy on the sound of the can­nons, sell on the sound of trum­pets.” You know, you’ve been around a long time, Tony, not since World War II, but what’s been your expe­ri­ence with wars and mar­kets?

Tony  02:35

Yeah, so, the Fin Review pub­lished some analy­sis about all of the wars in the 20th cen­tu­ry, and they do tend to send the stock mar­ket down when they start and it turns around and comes back pret­ty quick­ly soon after that, includ­ing the big ones; World War, World War II in par­tic­u­lar. I think, you know, I’ll draw a long bow and say it’s just the fact that the mar­ket does­n’t like uncer­tain­ty, and once, once an inva­sion actu­al­ly hap­pens and peo­ple see it may not be the end of the world, or the end of civ­i­liza­tion as they know that, they buy the bar­gains. It’s a bit more com­pli­cat­ed than that, because obvi­ous­ly, com­mod­i­ty prices are affect­ed. So, oil and gold have both gone up, par­tic­u­lar­ly oil. Gas has too because Rus­sia is a big gas sup­pli­er, and all the sanc­tions are going to hurt their busi­ness. Alu­mini­um’s in the same boat. Rus­sia, I think is the biggest pro­duc­er of alu­mini­um in the world, so alu­mini­um prices are going up quick­ly. So, I think it’s just the mar­ket adjust­ing.

Cameron  03:33

Right.

Tony  03:33

I’ll nev­er for­get, I remem­ber when I was work­ing at Shell in Bris­bane back in the ear­ly 90s and I was talk­ing to one of the ser­vice sta­tion oper­a­tors that I looked after, and he was say­ing he nev­er made so much mon­ey as when the Gulf War start­ed and he was in hos­pi­tal hav­ing an oper­a­tion and was laid up for a week or two, and just trad­ed the oil mar­ket while he was laid up in bed. And, you know, fill the tanks at his ser­vice sta­tions appro­pri­ate­ly or let them run down, and then refill them again quick­ly and sell it quick­ly and put the price up and what­not, and he made lots of mon­ey because the oil price is very, very fick­le or very-it moves very volatile when war starts. Espe­cial­ly, well, it did in that case in the Mid­dle East, and in this case it’s Rus­sia, which is also a big oil pro­duc­er.

Cameron  04:22

Yeah, I, you know, I also think that there’s an ele­ment of mil­i­tary Key­ne­sian­ism that’s got to be involved in this as well. You know, every­one knows that when a war’s going on gov­ern­ments, par­tic­u­lar­ly the Unit­ed States, are apt to set aside bil­lions or tril­lions of dol­lars to put the coun­try on war foot­ing or to sup­port their allies, send­ing them you know, aid or mon­ey to buy weapons, etc., etc., which flows back into the econ­o­my. So, it’s prob­a­bly an aspect of that around wartime as well, you know, they know that there’s going to be a lot of mon­ey flow­ing into the econ­o­my.

Tony  05:04

Yeah, so there’s a bit of that, but it does­n’t real­ly explain why the mar­ket goes down when the war starts and then ris­es quick­ly after that, so.

Cameron  05:11

Yeah.

Tony  05:13

That’s your rea­son­ing’s cer­tain­ly the case why I think Amer­i­ca was in Afghanistan for twen­ty odd years.

Cameron  05:18

Yes.

Tony  05:19

You know, just lined the pock­ets of the con­trac­tors and the mil­i­tary oper­a­tors for a long time.

Cameron  05:24

Yeah. And, you know, I’ve done a lot of analy­sis on how that works on the Cold War Show, as you know, and I was astound­ed when I did it, sort of, to realise where all that mon­ey goes. Like, you kind of think that, you know, when there’s mil­i­tary spend­ing it goes to peo­ple who make guns, and, you know, planes and ships and stuff like that. And then you start to realise that the Unit­ed States has eight hun­dred mil­i­tary bases around the world, and the Pen­ta­gon sup­plies those eight hun­dred bases and all of the peo­ple on those bases and all the peo­ple on boats, etc., with every­thing from con­doms, to tooth­paste, to food, to soft­ware to, you know, you name it, and ping pong tables, and the busi­ness­es in Amer­i­ca that sup­ply all of those, you know, dip their hands in the tin — in the Pen­ta­gon jar — and it’s a huge part of their income. Tens of thou­sands of busi­ness­es right across the US prof­it dur­ing war from Pen­ta­gon spend­ing, it’s a big part of it… and it’s easy mon­ey. They don’t have to bid for it usu­al­ly or not very hard, because usu­al­ly it’s being doled out in an emer­gency, dur­ing cri­sis times. “Quick! Need to spend $500 bil­lion, who wants it?”

Tony  06:45

Yeah. No ten­der. Well, it’s the old say­ing that war breaks out, buy paper­clips. I heard that some­where.

Cameron  06:54

Why do you do that?

Tony  06:55

Well, so, because there will be a lot of paper clips going into the US Army bases and going over­seas.

Cameron  07:00

Right. I thought it was to keep, tie all the cash togeth­er. Any­way, so I mean, it’s, it’s real­ly inter­est­ing times, obvi­ous­ly, ter­ri­ble stuff going on and no one wants to see war going on under any cir­cum­stances. But, I guess there’s not a lot we can do about it. We just need to…

Tony  07:23

Stop buy­ing Russ­ian vod­ka, I sup­pose. If you can reach out to the edi­tor, it would be great to have him on the show next week or as soon as we could, just to quiz him about what life’s like over there dur­ing wartime?

Cameron  07:37

Well, sure, I’ll try. I think he’s prob­a­bly more inter­est­ed in keep­ing his head. But who knows what’ll hap­pen between now and then, it could all be over?

Tony  07:47

And it could be a lot worse for us as well because, I mean, look, the Russ­ian rubles I think deval­ued by half, the inter­est rates are on 20% in Rus­sia and the stock mar­ket’s shut. So, we could have invest­ed in a Russ­ian com­pa­ny and we haven’t, which is lucky, but they’re doing it tough over there. Sanc­tions will prob­a­bly have some long-term effect, prob­a­bly not short-term effect in terms of get­ting out of Ukraine, but some long term effect.

Cameron  08:11

Mm. I guess we’ll see how it plays out.

Tony  08:14

I’ll leave it until the after hours, but I did want to com­ment on just how crap the Aus­tralian jour­nal­ism cov­er­age of the war is and how one sided it is. And I’ve found a cou­ple of peo­ple who are will­ing to give, not so much a Russ­ian point of view as a deep­er analy­sis into why Rus­sia might be doing what it’s doing. But I can save that ’til after hours, it’s very inter­est­ing.

Cameron  08:34

Did you lis­ten to my pod­cast about that?

Tony  08:37

I did. Yeah, well the first episode, I think there’s two episodes. I haven’t got­ten to two yet, but the first one, yeah.

Cameron  08:42

The sec­ond one that we did the end of last week, yeah, all about, you know, what’s going on and the media cov­er­age again. I was crit­i­cis­ing the ABC media cov­er­age, just ter­ri­ble. Woe­ful. Any­way.

Tony  08:54

It’s rub­bish.

Cameron  08:55

We’ll talk about that lat­er.

Tony  08:56

Yeah.

Cameron  08:57

Oth­er news this week is you increased the bank rate in the check­list from 3.42% to 4.49%. I saw some­body on Face­book ask where you came up with that num­ber from, you want to remind peo­ple how you come up with the num­ber?

Tony  09:10

Yeah, so that’s the, that’s the, I use ANZ, that’s the bank I have my home loan with but could be any­one, any of the big majors. But it’s the home loan ref­er­ence rate on their web­site. It’s now 4.49%. And it’s risen since the last time I had a look at it, large­ly because bond yields have risen. So, clear­ly the bond mar­ket is get­ting out ahead of the RBA in terms of rais­ing inter­est rates and we’re start­ing to see that flow thrown into inter­est rates for mort­gages as well, which is what we’re real­ly ref­er­enc­ing when we do our check to see if the yield is greater than the mort­gage rate.

Cameron  09:48

Only seems like yes­ter­day that peo­ple were telling us that inter­est rates were going to go to zero and stay there for­ev­er.

Tony  09:55

Well, yeah, it was dur­ing the COVID cough, was­n’t it? And after the COVID cough. And now there’s, you know, I think one of the rea­sons why the mar­ket has been a lit­tle buoy­ant recent­ly is because peo­ple, par­tic­u­lar­ly in the US, are start­ing to say that the war might put a hand­brake on rate ris­es over there. So, yeah, it’s a bit of a Yahoo moment for the US mar­ket, but we’ll see.

Cameron  10:16

Yeah. Okay, so peo­ple just doing your check­lists this week if you haven’t already, make sure you update that in the rel­e­vant spots in the check­list. MWY results, Mid­way, came out on Thurs­day last week, Tony. Sales were down 39%, the shares plum­met­ed by 19% in like sev­er­al hours. I owned Mid­way, but it’s been doing well before that. Dropped by 90%, still was­n’t a rule 1 sell for me, though. It was only about 8% below my buy price and I was won­der­ing, well, is this bad news? Should this be a bad news sell? But I only wait­ed a cou­ple of hours and then it did become a rule 1 sell, so I did­n’t have to wor­ry about whether or not it was a bad news sell any­more. But, I want­ed to ask you about that sit­u­a­tion in that sort of a sce­nario; sales down 39%, share price plum­mets to 19% in the morn­ing. What would you nor­mal­ly do?

Tony  11:18

Yeah, I’d prob­a­bly sell. But, usu­al­ly the deci­sion’s tak­en care of by either rule 1 or sen­ti­ment when some­thing big like that hap­pens. And I noticed on the Bret­ta­la­tor this morn­ing it was like a cent above of its sell price, but, like, I had a look at the sell line and it did­n’t make sense. And I had an email exchange with Brett quick­ly, so thanks, Brett, and he point­ed out that because today’s date is the first of March, there was a lit­tle bit of a, a trough cre­at­ed by the end of Feb­ru­ary and the first of March, but it was so small, you could­n’t see it on the graph. And if peo­ple are won­der­ing about the lines on the Bret­te­la­tor and it’s ear­ly in the month, they might want to go back and put a date in of 28th of Feb­ru­ary 2022, which of course you can do, and see what the sell line was like before the end of the month. But I have Mid­way as a sell at the moment.

Cameron  12:14

Right. Now, I read a lit­tle bit about why their sales were down, some­thing to do with glob­al pulp stocks trend­ing low­er due to COVID 19 pro­duc­tion and sup­ply con­straints. I know, I think you have talked before about a pulp com­mod­i­ty graph?

Tony  12:30

Yes, orig­i­nal­ly, I think we used soft lum­ber as the graph for Mid­way, but we changed it to pulp because that’s basi­cal­ly what they’re sell­ing. But, I looked up, it’s pret­ty hard to find a graph for pulp, but I looked up one which I found on the, it’s called Fred: Fred dot St Louis Fed. So, it’s the St. Louis Fed in the US, and it has a graph of pulp. But it looks strong to me, so I’m not sure if I’m using the wrong graph or whether the com­ments they’re cough­ing up is the rea­son why their sales are down are com­plete­ly accu­rate. What graph are you using?

Cameron  13:04

Yeah, I don’t have one. That’s what I was gonna ask you, what you were look­ing at?

Tony  13:10

Yeah, so I was look­ing at this one, the St. Louis Fed, which will be a US graph and applic­a­ble to the US. So, it’s quite pos­si­ble there’s anoth­er one out there which is more applic­a­ble to Aus­tralia, but I could­n’t find anoth­er one when I was look­ing today,

Cameron  13:24

Just won­der­ing if we could have pre­dict­ed this by look­ing at pulp com­modi­ties, but yeah, any­way.

Tony  13:32

We should be able to, but, yeah, it does­n’t appear to be the case. Which doesn’t make me think, like, I’m using the wrong graph by the way, when this kind of thing hap­pens. Yeah, so I’m not con­vinced I’m using the right graph.

Cameron  13:44

Well, that was bru­tal. Well, for those of us that helped Mid­way; 20% down in a day, right?

Tony  13:52

Well, the same thing is hap­pen­ing to me today with Sand­fire Resources. It’s down 13%.

Cameron  13:58

Woah!

Tony  13:59

As of time of record­ing, so I’ve had to sell out of that as well. It’s just crossed its sell line, so peo­ple might want to have a look at that. And it seems like that was on the basis of results not meet­ing ana­lysts’ pre­dic­tions. I think the results are quite strong, but ana­lysts thought they’d be a lit­tle bit stronger and had even fore­cast­ed a big­ger div­i­dend which I think is one of the prob­lems. There were some changes to the fore­cast for the new mine they’ve bought in Spain called MATSA, which to me, like my read­ing of the results were “okay, a lit­tle bit of a change there,” but the ana­lysts have gone ape shit over look­ing like MATSA will have a high­er cost of run­ning than what they first thought.

Cameron  14:37

Right. That’s no good.

Tony  14:41

No, and the cop­per price is still strong, so it’s a bit of anoth­er case of a stock drop­ping when the com­mod­i­ty price is strong. Which leads me to think that, okay, I’ve sold it, but it may it may actu­al­ly come back quick­ly.

Cameron  14:55

Yeah. Speak­ing of things drop­ping, Probuild, a major con­struc­tion com­pa­ny that’s among oth­er things sup­posed to be build­ing this mas­sive lux­u­ry apart­ment devel­op­ment in Queen Street in Bris­bane, it’s end­ed admin­is­tra­tion. I remem­ber a while ago, I think I men­tioned this on the show, but prob­a­bly some­time in the last year I was talk­ing to a mate of mine who is a devel­op­er down on the Gold Coast. And he told me then that they were start­ing to have prob­lems with some con­struc­tion com­pa­nies or sup­pli­ers going into admin­is­tra­tion. And he said, “you wait until the COVID mon­ey runs out, and you’re going to see con­struc­tion com­pa­nies all over the place falling over.” And, this is one. This isn’t the first that I’ve seen, but this is pos­si­bly one of the biggest. “Probuild, one of the largest build­ing com­pa­nies in the coun­try, gone into admin­is­tra­tion caught every­one by sur­prise,” accord­ing to Union exec­u­tives. It’s between sev­en to ten mil­lion owed the sub­con­trac­tors in this par­tic­u­lar instance. Not a good sign when you start to see big con­struc­tion com­pa­nies going under.

Tony  16:13

It’s not a good sign at all. It’s usu­al­ly the sign of an impend­ing reces­sion, because that usu­al­ly is what hap­pens at the start of reces­sions. It’s a good point about the COVID mon­ey and peo­ple like Alan Kohler have been talk­ing for a while about zom­bie com­pa­nies, com­pa­nies that are only still liv­ing and walk­ing because of the COVID fund­ing they’re receiv­ing from the gov­ern­ment. So, we might see some more of those as that COVID fund­ing has been pulled. But the prob­lem with builders going into reces­sion is that they employ a lot of peo­ple, and if there’s mon­ey owed to the sub­con­trac­tors then they’re gonna have to lay staff off as well. So, that can be a big hit. And of course, there are peo­ple who have already paid their deposits on some of these build­ings, espe­cial­ly if they’re apart­ment build­ings, who will lose their deposits too. So, it does have a ter­ri­ble impact on the econ­o­my. In this case it looks like its as much a prob­lem with sup­ply chains and labour costs and not get­ting labour and all that kind of stuff as much as it is the fact that this com­pa­ny has a South African par­ent, and I think the South African par­ent has drawn the line and is not will­ing to put the $10 mil­lion into it that it needs to keep the com­pa­ny afloat. So, there might be some­thing else at play behind the scenes from a cor­po­rate point of view, like they might I think it’s a good way to shut down and get out of Aus­tralia if that’s their strate­gic intent. But yeah, if we see some more of these, that’s not a good sign for the econ­o­my.

Cameron  17:35

Well, I did read that there had been appar­ent­ly a strat­e­gy to sell the Aus­tralian part of Probuild to a Chi­nese com­pa­ny, which the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment put the kibosh on. And, so yeah, that South African com­pa­ny par­ent has pulled the pin final­ly.

Tony  17:55

Right, yeah.

Cameron  17:56

So, a lot of dif­fer­ent stuff going on. Hope­ful­ly, it’s not the begin­ning of many more to come. Berk­shire Hath­away’s annu­al let­ter to share­hold­ers. War­ren Buf­fett, Christ­mas time for val­ue investors.

Tony  18:09

Yes, on a brighter note, Christ­mas time in March.

Cameron  18:12

Yeah, I read the first bit of it any­way, skimmed the rest of it. But I read the com­ments from War­ren, a lot of good stuff in there as always. My favourite is where he says “teach­ing, like writ­ing, has helped me devel­op and clar­i­fy my own thoughts. Char­lie calls this phe­nom­e­non the Orang­utan effect. If you sit down with an orang­utan and care­ful­ly explain to it one of your cher­ished ideas, you may leave behind a puz­zled pri­mate, but you will your­self exit think­ing more clear­ly.” And I was think­ing maybe we should call this pod­cast, change it to the Orang­utan Pod­cast.

Tony  18:47

I won­der why Char­lie used the Orang­utan in the exam­ple, and not a two-year-old or a lamp shade?

Cameron  18:55

Because Orang­utans are fun­ny, they’re inher­ent­ly fun­ny. And Char­lie is inher­ent­ly a fun­ny guy.

Tony  19:01

He is. It’s a good, it’s absolute­ly true as you and I both know from putting out pod­casts. You do learn a lot more and clar­i­fy your think­ing when you’re talk­ing about it and teach­ing peo­ple, don’t you?

Cameron  19:15

Same as writ­ing a book, you know, I found that with the last book, the psy­chopath book. Like it forces you to, I mean, if you want to do a good job, and you don’t want peo­ple to come back after­wards and say “you’re a com­plete idiot, what the hell are you talk­ing about?” You have to real­ly think through your posi­tion and you have to back it up and you have to chal­lenge your­self and get oth­er peo­ple to chal­lenge, all that kind of stuff. Yeah, but I know with a pod­cast, cer­tain­ly, you know, I know that from your per­spec­tive the pod­cast has forced you to quan­ti­fy some things that were pre­vi­ous­ly just gut feel for you for thir­ty years.

Tony  19:49

Yeah, sec­ond nature. That’s right. Yeah, for sure. Yeah, I mean, if you’re an oper­a­tor who’s not stop­ping and teach­ing peo­ple you do oper­ate at speed, so you don’t have to go back and think about why you’re doing it from first prin­ci­ples. So, teach­ing does force you to do that.

Cameron  20:04

So, what were your high­lights from the Berk­shire Hath­away let­ter?

Tony  20:08

I had quite a few, so sor­ry if I take some time here, might want to edit it if it gets too long. But the thing which strikes me every year when I read the let­ter is that first page with the returns from, you know, way back when — fifty odd years ago through ’til now ‑and the thing that strikes me always recent­ly is that the good years were real­ly ear­ly on, prob­a­bly up until about the 70s. You know, if you look at it, I think, going back, 1976 was the largest year in terms of returns and Berk­shire had 129.5% return that year, ver­sus the S&P 23.6. So, you know, bonz­er year for them that year. ’79 was sim­i­lar; 102% ver­sus S&P 18.2%. But for this cen­tu­ry, their largest year was 32.7%, and that was in a year when the S&P was up 32.4%. So, it’s cer­tain­ly, they’re cer­tain­ly still doing well and cer­tain­ly still hav­ing good years, but they’re slow­ing down. And now, Buf­fett always claims that’s because they have, they’re a larg­er busi­ness, they have larg­er funds to man­age and they have a lot of cash hold­ings. But, it does make me think that the oth­er thing that’s hap­pened over the years is Buf­fet­t’s style has changed. So, if peo­ple are famil­iar with his sto­ry, and I guess they are, he start­ed off as a deep val­ue investor in the Gra­ham School of pick­ing up cig­ar butts and get­ting one last puff before toss­ing them aside. And then he changed. I’m not sure exact­ly of the date, but it would have been prob­a­bly around the 70s or so, and became a qual­i­ty investor and famous­ly said he’d rather buy a qual­i­ty com­pa­ny at a rea­son­able price than a bad com­pa­ny at a great price. So, I’m won­der­ing whether it’s you know, Buf­fet­t’s being a bit of a magi­cian here and say­ing “look over there at all the cash on hold­ing, that’s slow­ing me down,” when real­ly what’s poten­tial­ly slow­ing him down is the fact that he isn’t real­ly a deep val­ue investor any­more. So, that’s the first thing. It is cer­tain­ly the case that they’ve got a lot more cash to invest in, but he comes out lat­er on in the in the let­ter and says that Berk­shire Hath­away is now I think, the biggest own­er of infra­struc­ture, by a cor­po­rate com­pa­ny in Amer­i­ca. And I think that’s, you know, again, point­ing towards why Berk­shire isn’t get­ting those big returns that it did ear­ly on. And infra­struc­ture, if you think about it, is a good invest­ment for Buf­fett. It kind of makes a lot of sense to me, because he looks for qual­i­ty, pre­dictable earn­ings in com­pa­nies with what he calls a “moat,” so they have a big bar­ri­er to entry. He’s got lots of cash, so infra­struc­ture requires lots of big invest­ments which is a bar­ri­er to entry. So, they often are gov­ern­ment monop­o­lies or high­ly gov­ern­ment reg­u­lat­ed, so that pro­vides some lev­el of pre­dictabil­i­ty in their earn­ings. And it’s kind of what, in some respects, Berk­shire Hath­away now reminds me of a super­an­nu­a­tion fund, much like the big ones in Aus­tralia — or in Cana­da, for that mat­ter, they tend to be big like ours. And super funds are going through a stage where they’re try­ing to invest in as much infra­struc­ture as pos­si­ble because they are a place to park large amounts of mon­ey, get a decent return, and not have the volatil­i­ty that you could get from invest­ments in oth­er com­pa­nies. And if you look at, like, the takeover of Syd­ney Air­port just recent­ly, that was dri­ven by super funds and that was an infra­struc­ture play. The oth­er one that comes to mind is APA, which I seem to think may have had an approach recent­ly as well. But they’re infra­struc­ture funds, and they real­ly do tick all the box­es for a Berk­shire Hath­away invest­ment. How­ev­er, they tend not to be high-well they are, by def­i­n­i­tion, not high growth because they’re often, you know, the price ris­es at hyper CPI and things like that by the gov­ern­ment. So, I kind of think that, yeah, Berk­shire Hath­away’s still doing well, but it is slow­ing down. I’m not sure we’re going to get the sort of, not sure for how much longer they’re going to get the sort of 20% a year returns that they’ve been get­ting over their pre­vi­ous life. So, that’s that point. One of the things that struck me again was just the way that Buf­fett is so hum­ble in what he writes. And he talks about, you know, he and Char­lie’s keen­ness to have long term share­hold­ers, how they care about them, how they think about them, how they try and align their objec­tives with them. And that res­onates with me as well. And I don’t know about you, Cam, but you know, I can’t under­score the feel­ing of respon­si­bil­i­ty that has, that I take for QAV — and we spoke about, about teach­ing things and how it makes you think clear­er — but par­tic­u­lar­ly for an invest­ing type pod­cast, if you’re teach­ing that, it does come with a great deal of respon­si­bil­i­ty. And, you know, it’s get­ting the teach­ing right, and the knowl­edge that peo­ple out there are trust­ing their sav­ings in futures to us. I’ve always kind of felt that because I’ve been doing it for Jen­ny and Alex, for my fam­i­ly, for a long time, so that respon­si­bil­i­ty has always been there. But, it’s even more keen­ly felt by me, I guess, going for­ward. And I guess the rea­son why I raise it is that, it’ll be, I think it’ll be the emo­tion­al response that some of our lis­ten­ers and investors start to have them­selves as their invest­ments, you know, gain a bit of trac­tion and become mean­ing­ful in their lives. And I think if you don’t have that kind of feel­ing about it then you’re prob­a­bly tak­ing it too light­ly, and you’ll make more mis­takes then you should. But, I think hav­ing that sort of sense of respon­si­bil­i­ty and stew­ard­ship is a good thing, and it comes out in Buf­fet­t’s annu­al let­ter as well.

Cameron  25:51

I agree. He always does have this warm, fuzzy fam­i­ly sort of feel about his let­ters and his talks when he talks in per­son. And I not­ed in one of the sec­tions here he said, “I make many mis­takes. I like that. He’s always the first per­son to admit that he gets it wrong. Which is, which is good. You want to hear that.

Tony  26:15

He’s a good mar­keter, isn’t he? Before you chal­lenge me on my mis­takes, I’m just gonna step up and say I make them. Yeah.

Cameron  26:21

Well, you know, we’ve said this many times on this show, too, with our week­ly check­list or stuff that we pick, like, you’re not quite a God yet. We’ve got you nom­i­nat­ed in God­hood, but you’re not quite a God. We’re humans and humans make mis­takes, even if they have a real­ly good sys­tem, and like Buf­fett they’ve been doing it for a mil­lion years and have been very, very suc­cess­ful. He’s a human at the end of the day,

Tony  26:51

Cor­rect, yeah. Yeah, we haven’t greased palm of the Catholic Church enough yet. So, one day maybe.

Cameron  26:57

No, yeah. By the way, it’s not their palm that they want greased.

Tony  27:01

I’ll leave that one alone.

Cameron  27:07

They won’t. If only they would leave that alone. If only. Any­way.

Tony  27:14

Okay. A cou­ple of oth­er points he makes, again, Buf­fett talks about the impor­tance of float. And that’s, he’s talk­ing about the mon­ey held by insur­ance com­pa­nies with­in the Berk­shire Hath­away group that needs to, may need to be redeemed over time. So, can turn over quick­ly for car insur­ance, but can be long term for life insur­ance. And Buf­fet­t’s always tried to write poli­cies which are prof­itable, and there­fore the float is his to invest. And, you know, you can’t under­score the impor­tance of that for Berk­shire Hath­away, it’s real­ly like hav­ing an inter­est free loan that he can go and invest and not have to wor­ry about pay­ing any yield on or any mort­gage pay­ments on. And that’s sit­ting at $147 bil­lion dol­lars now, so it’s a siz­able free loan to Berk­shire Hath­away which def­i­nite­ly boosts their their prof­its. He talks about the giants of his busi­ness, now. He said there’s four giants; there’s the insur­ance busi­ness, Apple is now such a large part of their invest­ments that it’s get­ting up to being 25% of the worth of the com­pa­ny, rail­roads is his third giant and ener­gy is his fourth giant. So, going back to what I said before about infra­struc­ture, rail­roads and ener­gy cer­tain­ly fit into that. Almost monop­oly like char­ac­ter­is­tics that Buf­fett seeks. And, you know, he’s doing the right thing by his share­hold­ers here. He has a lot of mon­ey that he’s try­ing to stew­ard and keep from going back­wards, and he’s say­ing, basi­cal­ly, “I may not get great returns going for­ward, but you know, trust me, you’re not going to lose a lot of mon­ey as well.” And cer­tain­ly, infra­struc­ture fits that bill. And if you think about it, like, I mean, some peo­ple might want to con­sid­er this that are lis­ten­ing to this pod­cast. But, you know, twen­ty years ago there were a lot of infra­struc­ture stocks on the share mar­ket — there’s only a cou­ple at the moment. But, one of the ben­e­fits of invest­ing in them is it takes time, but the div­i­dends grow to a stage, espe­cial­ly if you rein­vest them when, after about ten-fif­teen years, you’re real­ly get­ting your at least 20% return just from the fact the div­i­dends are that much big­ger. So, if I think about APA which I spoke about before, APA is Aus­tralian Pipelines, it’s just basi­cal­ly the pipeline infra­struc­ture to send gas around Aus­tralia. It’s a low growth com­pa­ny because of that, it only real­ly grows if they acquire anoth­er pipe net­work or buy anoth­er or add to their cur­rent pipe net­work. It tends, you know, they can get, I guess, some fee rais­es from the gas com­pa­nies that use their pipes, but it’s all pret­ty low growth, sol­id, heavy cap­i­tal invest­ing. But they do pay, you know, around a 5% yield, and even with low growth that com­pa­ny over, say, ten years is prob­a­bly going to dou­ble its worth and there­fore the yield is grow­ing to 10%. And if you’re rein­vest­ing, it’s com­pound­ing as well along­side the growth of the com­pa­ny. And so, you know, over a peri­od of time the div­i­dends become real­ly impor­tant and you rein­vest them, they com­pound, and you can get up to, sort of, to become a long-term share­hold­er in those com­pa­nies, you can get 15/16/17% growth, div­i­dends and cap­i­tal com­bined in a low growth com­pa­ny. So, I can see what the attrac­tion is to Buf­fett for that. I think that’s prob­a­bly it. The last point I’ll make is that he freely admits that he has lots of cash and the way he’s been deploy­ing it because he can’t find things to buy, as he calls them “ele­phants”, is by doing share buy­backs. So, that’s one of the things prop­ping up the Berk­shire Hath­away share price. They’ve bought back some­thing like $50 bil­lion in the last two years. So, it’s cer­tain­ly a mean­ing­ful thing for them at the moment.

Cameron  31:08

What are you tap­ping in the back­ground?

Tony  31:10

Sor­ry, my pen.

Cameron  31:14

I read, I think, that they’re sit­ting on $200 bil­lion in cash at the moment.

Tony  31:19

Are they real­ly? I had a small num­ber, but I would­n’t…

Cameron  31:23

That might be Aus­tralian.

Tony  31:26

Yeah, could be Aus­tralian. I think it was about 150 bil­lion in cash I reck­on, 147, some­thing like that, yeah.

Cameron  31:31

And I saw, you know, Char­lie was talk­ing about it in his dai­ly jour­nal Q&A, and he was say­ing, you know, “it’s not that we want to sit on cash, we just can’t find any­thing worth buy­ing at a price we’re will­ing to pay for it.”

Tony  31:46

Yeah.

Cameron  31:48

Some oth­er quotes that I liked out of War­ren’s part of the let­ter; “Char­lie and I are not stock pick­ers, we are busi­ness pick­ers.” Per­son­al­ly, I’m a nose pick­er, but does­n’t pay as well. Busi­ness pick­ers. What do you think about that state­ment? Do you feel like a busi­ness pick­er?

Tony  32:07

No, bit of a stock… a bit of both I sup­pose, a bit of a stock pick­er. What he’s say­ing there is he’s not chas­ing short term returns again, he’s chas­ing busi­ness­es which are going to be robust for the long term. So, it is, I mean, he has grown to be a dif­fer­ent investor to the way I invest. He’s no longer a val­ue investor, I think, he’s more like a super fund.

Cameron  32:27

Right. The oth­er quote that I liked was “decep­tive adjust­ments to earn­ings, to use a polite descrip­tion, have become both more fre­quent and more fan­ci­ful as stocks have risen. Speak­ing less polite­ly, I would say that bull mar­kets breed blovi­at­ed bull…”

Tony  32:51

Com­plete­ly, com­plete­ly right. Com­plete­ly accu­rate. Yeah.

Cameron  32:55

But I like this guy in his ear­ly 90s, able to write stuff like that. And Char­lie at 98 — there was a thing I post­ed in our Face­book group, some­body did like a com­pi­la­tion of Char­lie’s, of Char­lie quotes from his most recent dai­ly jour­nal Q&A AGM, and there’s some annoy­ing music behind it but the quotes them­selves are great. And like, he’s 98 and he’s so fun­ny and direct, and so much wis­dom about how things have changed and where things are at, and just real­ly, real­ly impres­sive at that age to be that coher­ent and cogent and insight­ful and shar­ing it, you know, fan­tas­tic.

Tony  33:34

Yeah. No, it’s great. Char­lie’s always worth lis­ten­ing to. One of the quotes that stuck in in my mind after that was, I think the per­son ask­ing the ques­tions was ask­ing, “what’s going to hap­pen when inter­est rates go up?” And Char­lie just came out and said “it won’t end well.”

Cameron  33:52

Yeah.

Tony  33:53

But he said it may take a long time before it won’t end well.

Cameron  33:56

Yeah. A lit­tle bit of more good news from the week; GRR, one of our stock picks from a cou­ple of weeks ago shot up 38% yes­ter­day morn­ing. Came down a lit­tle bit by the end of the day, I think it closed some­where like 33 or 35% up for the day. Tay­lor was hap­py for once, because he bought it and his mate Chris bought it. This comes on the back of its report that came out after the mar­ket closed on Fri­day, rev­enue for the year was up 49%. Think they report on a Decem­ber 31st year by the looks of it. And prof­it was up 58%. And it made me think, you know, we get this ques­tion from time to time and we got it just recent­ly because it’s report­ing sea­son and peo­ple always ask you, “should we wait till the report comes out before we buy a stock? It’s a lit­tle bit risky to buy before the report comes out.” And I think, in fact, last week you said “no, I just go and, you know, let it play out as it does.” And this was a great exam­ple of that. We bought, we rec­om­mend it — we did­n’t buy it for our port­fo­lio, but it was one of our stocks of the week two weeks ago. So, two weeks before their report came out, and then it shot up 38% on the day after the report came out. So, you know, if you did­n’t buy it two weeks ago, you missed out on prob­a­bly the most growth that it’ll have this year.

Tony  35:24

Yeah, well poten­tial­ly, yeah. It is a two-edged sword. I mean, Sand­fire has gone down 13% since the results came out, so it can cut both ways. But gen­er­al­ly, if we’re buy­ing cheap, qual­i­ty com­pa­nies, the results should be good.

Cameron  35:38

Right, yep.

Tony  35:40

More often than not, any­way.

Cameron  35:41

Yeah. You want­ed to talk about the Navexa dum­my port­fo­lio?

Tony  35:46

All I want­ed to talk about was, I can talk about it gen­er­al­ly. So, when I realised that Navexa was­n’t adding cash back into our port­fo­lio size even though I think it was tak­ing the div­i­dends, etc. into account when work­ing out our per­for­mance, it just did ham­mer home again to me the impor­tance of div­i­dends. So, I kind of just touched on it with that Aus­tralian Pipeline exam­ple, but yeah, I mean, I think Navexa said some­thing like we had $5,000 worth of div­i­dends sit­ting there that had­n’t been account­ed for prop­er­ly in their port­fo­lio, which is 25% of what we start­ed off with. So, over a cou­ple of years that’s grown into a mean­ing­ful num­ber, and you know, we rein­vest­ed that last week once we worked out what was going on. But yeah, I mean, one of the things in the check­list is that we look for com­pa­nies with a yield, a decent yield, and we use the mort­gage rate as a bench­mark which allows us to invest in them and have the div­i­dends cov­er the inter­est pay­ments. But equal­ly just as impor­tant is that the div­i­dends are a mean­ing­ful con­trib­u­tor to growth, espe­cial­ly over time; when they com­pound, when they get rein­vest­ed, and we get the tax ben­e­fits of them, too. So, I guess the last point is that div­i­dends are a lot more sta­ble than the stock growth or stock price move­ment can be. So, I’ve spo­ken before about how even in the GFC com­pa­nies were loath to cut their div­i­dends, and I think on aver­age they did, but maybe only by about 25%, maybe 30%. So, it’s a big part of the Aus­tralian share mar­ket. It’s not the same in the US where they don’t have frank­ing cred­its so it does­n’t car­ry as much impor­tance, but cer­tain­ly in Aus­tralia that kind of pre­dictable addi­tion to cap­i­tal growth is impor­tant.

Cameron  37:43

Right. Okay. Well, the last note that I’ve got is some­body sent me an email yes­ter­day say­ing, “hey, the QAV web­site is real­ly slow for me, am I doing some­thing wrong?” No, it’s not you. It’s the web­site. It’s very, very slow. It’s been get­ting slow­er and slow­er for sev­er­al months. And, just to let every­body know that I’m replac­ing the IT team, I’m in the process, lit­er­al­ly, today, we’re migrat­ing the host­ing over from where it’s been for the last cou­ple of years to a new ser­vice facil­i­ty in Bris­bane with a new IT sup­port team in Bris­bane. The cur­rent ones been in Johan­nes­burg, and it’s very hard to go and hit him with a lead pipe when things aren’t work­ing well. Now, I can go and, you know, break knees if I need to, to keep the web­site up and run­ning. So, hope­ful­ly it won’t be as ter­ri­ble in a week or two from now. But fin­gers crossed. But my apolo­gies if you’re hav­ing a hard time get­ting into the web­site.

Tony  38:45

Well, good news. That’s well done to find some local peo­ple to pro­vide sup­port. Yeah, I know you’ve had prob­lems with the over­seas guys for a while now.

Cameron  38:54

Yeah, I mean, I have no guar­an­tee that the local guys are gonna be any bet­ter quite frankly, but they’ve been around a long time. They’re ten min­utes away. I can, you know, I want to be able to go and eye­ball peo­ple.

Tony  39:07

Yep.

Cameron  39:08

Have a chat. Any­thing else before we get into Q&A, Tony?

Tony  39:13

No, that’s all for me. Thank you.

Cameron  39:14

Alright. Bryan says “I’ve been hav­ing a look at the lat­est buy list and it appears that there’s a group of com­pa­nies that have been award­ed a point for the ques­tion ‘is the share price less than the con­sen­sus IV’ based on stale, some­times very stale con­sen­sus tar­gets. In my view they should lose that point and move down the list accord­ing­ly. A twelve-month pro­jec­tion made in 2018 is not much use to us today. The date is avail­able in Stock Doc­tor. I’d be inter­est­ed in hear­ing your thoughts.”

Tony  39:51

Yeah, great pick­up, Bryan. So, a cou­ple of things. I remem­ber rais­ing an issue with Stock Doc­tor a while ago as to why the front page in Stock Doc­tor, the com­pa­ny infor­ma­tion page, was show­ing no con­sen­sus fore­cast but our fil­ters were hav­ing a con­sen­sus fore­cast. And I got an answer, which said some­thing like that they had to have three bro­kers giv­ing a con­sen­sus fore­cast before they put it in the front page, but if they had one it was going into the stock fil­ter. But, I think what Bryan’s uncov­ered is what’s real­ly going on, is that they’re just, once they have a con­sen­sus price fore­cast it’s going into the fil­ter and it’s stay­ing even though it’s old. But, if it’s not, they’re doing some kind of recen­cy test on the front page. So, Bryan’s com­plete­ly right, I did go and check some of his data with Yahoo Finance to see if it was a, you know, a data issue in Stock Doc­tor, but it seems like Yahoo Finance and the num­bers that Bryan pulled out of Stock Doc­tor cor­re­late. So, we do have an issue there. I’m going to have to go and change the check­list to down­load the con­sen­sus tar­get date which Bryan has pro­vid­ed and then do a recen­cy test on that before we can score a com­pa­ny based on con­sen­sus fore­cast, because Bryan’s giv­en us a long list here but there’s only one, two, three, I count­ed about half a dozen that are on our buy list at the moment. So, it’s not going to be a major impact to our buy list I don’t think, but I will do some work next week and get it right and put out a new check­list in the future.

Cameron  41:25

All right. And we’ll have to do the same with the AF ver­sion as well.

Tony  41:29

Yeah.

Cameron  41:29

I spoke to Vic­tor at Stock Doc­tor yes­ter­day, he just hap­pened to call me. He’s, he calls me now like, once a month going “any­thing you need? Any­thing I can do?” which is great. And I said, “lis­ten,” I asked him about this ques­tion, and I was hop­ing that we could build some­thing into the fil­ter in Stock Doc­tor which would say if the con­sen­sus price tar­get date is greater than a year old, you know, don’t give it to us or some­thing like that. You can’t do that. You can set, you have to go in, there’s like a lit­tle cal­en­dar drop down, you have to set it every time basi­cal­ly. Or, you can do it dur­ing the report­ing peri­od, I guess, you could say “don’t give me any­thing that’s old­er than the last report­ing peri­od” or some­thing like that.

Tony  42:20

Yeah, right.

Cameron  42:21

But it’s a bit clunky. So, I think your method is prob­a­bly bet­ter; just down­load the tar­get date and… What hap­pens if they, I mean, I don’t know, what hap­pens if they have three con­sen­sus tar­get ana­lysts? Do we get three dates?

Tony  42:37

Yeah, I don’t know, Cam, I just start­ed to inves­ti­gate this today but I’ll need to spend some time on it next week. Just going through all those lit­tle wrin­kles that are prob­a­bly there that we need to work out.

Cameron  42:47

But you agree with Bryan’s basic premise that an old con­sen­sus is use­less to us, right?

Tony  42:51

I do. Well, not entire­ly, but cer­tain­ly in about half a dozen cas­es, yes.

Cameron  43:00

Under what con­di­tion would a five-year old con­sen­sus not be use­less to us?

Tony  43:05

No, well, I don’t know if what Bri­an’s giv­ing us is a com­plete list or not. But if it is a com­plete list, there is only about half a dozen stocks on there which are on the buy list. So, I haven’t gone back in to check yet, but I’m assum­ing all the oth­er stocks on the buy list have a recent con­sen­sus tar­get.

Cameron  43:20

Yeah, no, but I’m say­ing that you agree, though, that if we have a stock that is on the check­list and it’s got a con­sen­sus tar­get that’s more than a year old, it’s not very use­ful to us?

Tony  43:32

Com­plete­ly. I agree. Yeah. I don’t even know why Stock Doc­tor just don’t flush it.

Cameron  43:38

Yeah, exact­ly. Yeah, I asked Vic­tor about that. He said that he did have some sort of a devel­op­er note in to look at it, but you know, it’s not get­ting pri­or­i­ty. ZGL, which has been — well, it was at the top of our list for six months — accord­ing to this thing that Bri­an sent us, it’s con­sen­sus tar­get dates from 2013.

Tony  43:59

Yeah.

Cameron  43:59

Not great.

Tony  44:00

And Yahoo Finance back that up, too, so it was­n’t a cor­rup­tion issue in Stock Doc­tor.

Cameron  44:04

Right, which is not sur­pris­ing, because it’s a very, it’s a very small ADT stock. So, no ana­lyst is real­ly going to look at it.

Tony  44:12

No, cor­rect.

Cameron  44:13

But tak­ing that one point out of our check­list isn’t going to make a huge impact to its over­all QAV score, right?

Tony  44:21

No, not at all. Cor­rect.

Cameron  44:23

Yeah. Still good pick up, Bryan. Well done. Alex has a ques­tion some­what relat­ed to this that he sent through on Face­book yes­ter­day. I haven’t warned you about this, but I think it’s pret­ty sim­ple. He says, “a ques­tion about ‘price is less than or equal to con­sen­sus’. In the AF spread­sheet, this is count­ed towards the qual­i­ty score, but does­n’t appear to count towards Tony’s score in his spread­sheet. I noticed the dif­fer­ence on this week’s score­card because I was get­ting a qual­i­ty score of 57% using the AF and the offi­cial score­card was get­ting 50.54%.” That’s not a qual­i­ty score, it would have to be 57% not 54%, “for ECX. Which one is cor­rect?” Do you know off the top of your head if that price is less than or equal to con­sen­sus is sup­posed to con­tribute towards a score?

Tony  45:21

Yeah, it’s meant to. I did­n’t know it was­n’t, so I’ll have to take it on notice and have a look.

Cameron  45:25

Okay. Jol­ly good. Jeff asks, or says real­ly, “Hi Cam. So, I’ve been read­ing What Works on Wall Street, and not­ed the author James O. Shaugh­nessy’s,” to be sure to be sure “empha­sis on momen­tum using one-year rel­a­tive pos­i­tive price change as being an impor­tant fac­tor in choos­ing stocks for out­per­for­mance.” He quotes from the book: “ ‘the advice is sim­ple. Unless finan­cial ruin is your goal, avoid the biggest one-year losers. Buy stocks with the best one-year rel­a­tive strength, but under­stand that their volatil­i­ty will con­tin­u­al­ly test your emo­tion­al endurance. In com­ing chap­ters, we will see how rel­a­tive strength is an excel­lent fac­tor to use in con­junc­tion with oth­er fac­tors to help us avoid the most rich­ly val­ued stocks. For now we see that rel­a­tive strength is among the only pure growth fac­tors that actu­al­ly beat the mar­ket.’ ” Then Jeff con­tin­ues, “I can see QAV has incor­po­rat­ed momen­tum in sev­er­al ways; is SDMax bull­ish, is the five-year price change pos­i­tive, is six-month price change pos­i­tive, plus a point for hav­ing all three above. Then we also use man­u­al data to check for pos­i­tive sen­ti­ment. But James O’Shaugh­nessy goes on to analyse five-year peri­ods. ‘Instead of rank­ing stocks by their one-year per­for­mance, I ranked them on absolute per­for­mance over the pri­or five years. Here stocks with the worst five-year per­for­mance snapped back in the next one-year peri­od, where­as those with the best five-year num­bers end­ed up with far more mod­est per­for­mance in the fol­low­ing year.’ And he con­cludes that, ‘so although the per­for­mance of stocks with strong one-year pos­i­tive or neg­a­tive rel­a­tive strength tend to keep hit­ting in the same direc­tion, the oppo­site is true when look­ing at five-year peri­ods. Stocks that have exhib­it­ed five years of strong rel­a­tive strength, either pos­i­tive or neg­a­tive, are usu­al­ly on the brink of a turn­around. So,’ ” James, or Jeff con­tin­ues, “so accord­ing to his results, a strong five-year pos­i­tive price change is a neg­a­tive fac­tor when screen­ing for out­per­for­mance, and there­fore QAV should be rank­ing high five-year price change pos­i­tive as a neg­a­tive fac­tor? Or have I had too much or not enough cof­fee? Regards, Jeff.” We don’t actu­al­ly use those things for our scor­ing, do we?

Tony  47:43

No. So, we use the five-year price chart and the man­u­al sen­ti­ment check. We don’t use SDMax five-year price change or six-month price change. So, they’re there in my spread­sheet as a short­hand way to see if we can code for the three-point trend line check­ing. And this was a sug­ges­tion from Steve Mabb way back, and I put it in the check­list. It does cor­re­late some­what with our three-point trend line check­ing. So, if a com­pa­ny is SDMax bull­ish in Stock Doc­tor, has a five-year pos­i­tive price change and a six-month pos­i­tive price change, it gets cod­ed into the check­list as being a bull­ish stock. And if it does­n’t have all three of those things, it gets a bear­ish cod­ing in the check­list. But I just, that’s essen­tial­ly not used in cal­cu­lat­ing the QAV score. I still use it myself, because rather than if I have a down­load which says there are two hun­dred stocks to go through and check sen­ti­ment on, I’ll just sim­ply skip through and look at the ones where that cal­cu­la­tion for bear­ish or bull­ish is dif­fer­ent to how I last did my three-point trend line check and just look at those stocks, which makes the whole exer­cise a lot quick­er. But that’s all it’s being used for. It’s just a time saver on my behalf. Essen­tial­ly you can take those out of the check­list and ignore them, they don’t go into the QAV score at all. As for the oth­er com­ments about the turn­arounds or one-year stocks that have done bad or five-year stocks that have done well, I don’t doubt Shaugh­nessy’s research, but I’d have to go and research it myself and just see if, you know, under what con­di­tions that applies. So, it’s a bit of a dog to the Dow in terms of the one-year per­for­mance. That’s, you know, if you recall, we did a bit of a look at that. And that’s when the worst per­form­ers from last year are often the best per­for­mance this year. So, that’s cer­tain­ly some­thing that peo­ple can play around with. It does­n’t give us, does­n’t usu­al­ly give us 20% returns, but, you know, 15% returns aren’t unheard of from that kind of strat­e­gy. But as to the five-year ones, I mean it begs more ques­tions than it answers. Are we talk­ing about a stock which has con­sis­tent­ly gone up over five years? One that has gone up and gone back and then gone up again? What are the con­di­tions under which this applies or does­n’t apply? So, I’d have to look into it in more detail. But cer­tain­ly, my expe­ri­ence is the five-year month­ly is the best graph to use, and if it’s going up at the end, gen­er­al­ly it’s a good stock to buy.

Cameron  50:25

But, you know, quite often they haven’t had a straight run for five years when we look at the chart like O’Shaugh­nessy’s talk­ing about, and it’s only one of the fac­tors that we look at, right? We’re look­ing at a whole bunch of oth­er fac­tors as well, not just, you know, it’s price per­for­mance over time.

Tony  50:43

Yeah, well the sen­ti­ment check­er is a go-no-go but yeah, we don’t look at… I’m not sure, is he just talk­ing about shares which have had a five-year con­tin­u­ous upturn, or is there some­thing else in there? I’m not sure, I’d have to do some research on that.

Cameron  50:58

Yeah, he says “stocks that have exhib­it­ed five years of strong rel­a­tive strength, either pos­i­tive or neg­a­tive, are usu­al­ly on the brink of a turn­around.” So, I guess if they, if they’ve, what’s strong rel­a­tive strength that’s neg­a­tive?

Tony  51:14

Cor­rect. Yeah. Does it beat the index? Has it gone up and down with the index? I mean, I don’t know.

Cameron  51:20

Yeah.

Tony  51:21

I do have that book to read, so I’ll, you know, get to it one day and may change my think­ing. But at the moment, I’d need to do some more research before I want­ed to change our check­list on that basis.

Cameron  51:33

All right. Well, thanks for bring­ing that to our atten­tion, Jeff, it’s a good book. I real­ly — haven’t fin­ished it, I got halfway through it — I real­ly enjoyed it from what I read. Alice says “it would be great to see an exam­ple of how to cal­cu­late CAGR in Excel.” She has an exam­ple that she found, was won­der­ing if that was how you did it. She sug­gest­ed that we should maybe do a video on it, and I thought that’s not a bad idea because I’m not real­ly clear on how to do it either.

Tony  52:03

Yeah, well, we can, sure. Alice has got it right. So, peo­ple can’t see it, but she sent through an exam­ple. And essen­tial­ly, she’s using the RRI cal­cu­la­tor, or for­mu­la, in Excel and she’s used it cor­rect­ly. So, yes Alice, that’s right, and well picked up. It’s some­thing that we’ve been focus­ing on in the last cou­ple of months as we’ve had ques­tions over Navexa, and it’s the way it treats our port­fo­lio in terms of per­for­mance. Not just Navexa, but Stock Doc­tor and all the oth­er port­fo­lio providers. There is anoth­er way of doing it in Excel, but essen­tial­ly it gives me the same num­bers. And you might, you know, some­times I’ll do both just to make sure that, one’s a san­i­ty check for the oth­er, that I’ve got the right num­ber, but you can actu­al­ly code in the CAGR for­mu­la for your­self and you can look it up. But, it’s basi­cal­ly the growth over a peri­od of time raised to the pow­er of one divid­ed by the num­ber of years you’re look­ing at to the minus one pow­er. So, it sounds com­pli­cat­ed, but it’s not that hard. It’s basi­cal­ly, if you added two columns to what you’ve got, and Alice has got a sim­ple series of cells run­ning from 2010–2015. The first row has a start­ing amount of $200,000 and then it increas­es to 220 in the sec­ond month, 270-sor­ry sec­ond year- to 20,000 then to 733390, and in 2015 it’s 450,000. And if Alice added a col­umn beside that where she record­ed the growth every year, so in 2011 the port­fo­lio grew by 10%, and then it grows again, etc., etc., each year. And if she adds those up, she’ll get to the amount of growth in the port­fo­lio and then input it into the CAGR for­mu­la and it will also come up with the same result as our RRI. I guess a cou­ple of points. This is the way that a closed end port­fo­lio is best to be cal­cu­lat­ed, and by that, I mean there’s not huge amounts of mon­ey com­ing in and com­ing out. So, for exam­ple, in those num­bers I read out, if, say, in year three anoth­er $100,000 was put into the port­fo­lio, it would boost the returns even though it was just pas­sive­ly inject­ed. Again, in my port­fo­lio I just ignore those things main­ly. Mon­ey’s always going to come in and go out for tax­a­tion rea­sons or to spend on race­hors­es or golf balls or what­ev­er, and you real­ly have to live with that. But these for­mu­las are main­ly for funds which stay intact and don’t have a lot of mon­ey com­ing in and com­ing out. There are oth­er for­mu­las in Excel which deal more with those funds which have lots of mon­ey com­ing in and com­ing out or have lumpy cash flows, like there are peo­ple who add on $1 cost aver­ag­ing basis, they might add every year or every month into the port­fo­lio. So, you can look up those two, there’s a whole lot of NPV for­mu­las which deal with those, but cer­tain­ly RRI or to man­u­al­ly cal­cu­late the CAGR for­mu­la are the two ones to go with. I did just want to raise one point for peo­ple. So, in Alice’s exam­ple, there are actu­al­ly six rows. So, the first one is called Peri­od Zero, but there real­ly are only five years in the per­for­mance of this port­fo­lio that we’re con­cerned with. And so, and num­ber five is the num­ber of peri­ods. When I do this, I can use dec­i­mal points. So, for exam­ple, if I’m cal­cu­lat­ing the dum­my port­fo­lio progress since Sep­tem­ber 2019, we’ve had two- and a‑bit years. So, that’s what, 2.4 years, I think. I would plug 2.4 into the num­ber of peri­ods, and that would still cal­cu­late a CAGR for that par­tial year for me as well. So, that’s pos­si­ble. But we nor­mal­ly talk in years as a num­ber of peri­ods. You can do an RRI or a CAGR cal­cu­la­tion for months, but unless you’re start­ing out it kind of becomes mean­ing­less after the first year.

Cameron  56:29

Right. NPV being Net Present Val­ue.

Tony  56:34

Yeah, yep. And so RRI, that for­mu­la that Alice was talk­ing about has the reverse in Excel called IRR, Inter­nal Rate of Return. It’s a bit more com­pli­cat­ed, but it does allow you to put in a whole series of inputs as you’re adding mon­ey to the port­fo­lio and get a cal­cu­lat­ed num­ber, which smooths those out.

Cameron  56:56

Right. Thank you, Alice. Alice also had a late ques­tion, Tony, that I threw in via Face­book. She said, “can you please check again about stocks that have a DPR of greater than 100%? When I asked about this last year, the response was that it was a red flag because the com­pa­ny could be pay­ing more in div­i­dends than they are earn­ing, pos­si­bly bor­row­ing to fund div­i­dends or tak­ing it from cash reserves. IGL is a case in point.” Remem­ber talk­ing about this pre­vi­ous­ly?

Tony  57:25

Yeah, I do. Yeah, it nor­mal­ly is a red flag because the com­pa­ny is des­per­ate to main­tain its div­i­dend lev­el. It can be a short-term prob­lem, because the com­pa­ny might think that things will turn around next year and there’s a one-off rea­son why they’re doing it. But, I don’t know why IGL would be doing that. I’m just going to have a look at it now.

Cameron  57:44

Where do we find the DPR?

Tony  57:47

Well, we don’t, but we can do a quick cal­cu­la­tion. In Stock Doc­tor on the Finan­cial State­ments page, there’s, at the bot­tom there’s “income”, so we’ve got div­i­dend per share. So, the most recent div­i­dend per share for IGL is 15.5 cents, and the earn­ings per share… oh okay, sor­ry, let me just go back. Div­i­dend per share was 14 cents in its most recent reports, which was back in Sep­tem­ber, but they only had an earn­ings per share of 9 cents. So, they fund­ed the extra 5 from retained earn­ings or bor­row­ings. And that can be a real prob­lem.

Cameron  58:30

Right.

Tony  58:31

Par­tic­u­lar­ly if it goes ahead. So, if you look at the…

Cameron  58:33

Oh actu­al­ly, you can see it right under­neath DPS on that page, Div­i­dend Pay­out Ratio.

Tony  58:37

Oh, yeah it is too. It’s there now, you’re right. So, 105%, yeah. Where­as if you look at it his­tor­i­cal­ly, it’s been 28% the peri­od before they cut their div­i­dend, the peri­od before 36, has been as high as 75 before that. So, yeah.

Cameron  58:53

But we don’t real­ly look at this in the check­list, right? DPR is not in our check­list.

Tony  58:58

No, we don’t. It pos­si­bly should be there, but we don’t look at it.

Cameron  59:03

So, it’s a red flag. What would you do if you did hap­pen to notice this and you were think­ing about invest­ing in IGL — which, by the way, has been a great per­former for me recent­ly. After sit­ting there and doing noth­ing for six months, and near­ly even rule 1ing it at one stage, it just shot up recent­ly. But, what would you do in an instance like this? What would you be look­ing at? How would it influ­ence your deci­sions?

Tony  59:31

I may do some more research onto why it’s occurred and I’d prob­a­bly have to go and read the results pre­sen­ta­tion or even the annu­al report to see why they were doing. I’m just going to go back and look at the pri­or DPS’. So, yeah okay, div­i­dends have been up and down a lot. So, it’s, as I said before, man­age­ment is often loath to cut div­i­dends, but they’re usu­al­ly not stu­pid. They won’t, they can’t fund a high div­i­dend pay­out ratio for a long time, so it may drop next half or man­age­ment may feel com­fort­able they can replen­ish wher­ev­er they used to fund a div­i­dend, either their retained earn­ings or bor­row­ings with a bet­ter half that they’re fore­cast­ing. So, I’d be look­ing to see if they have a rea­son. But, if they made a con­tin­u­ous, you know, if there was two or three halves of this, I would con­sid­er not invest­ing. But at the moment, you know, IGL meets all their oth­er met­rics, so I’d still buy into it.

Cameron  1:00:28

Well, look­ing at their prof­it and loss over the last few years, they’ve had a tough cou­ple of years. Their total oper­at­ing rev­enue has been going back­wards since June ’19, by the looks of it. You know, prob­a­bly COVID relat­ed, no doubt. They’re like a mar­ket­ing busi­ness, aren’t they?

Tony  1:00:47

They are.

Cameron  1:00:47

Mar­ket­ing and, you know, the print­ing and all that kind of stuff.

Tony  1:00:51

Cor­rect.

Cameron  1:00:52

Been a tough few years for them in terms of rev­enue any­way. So, maybe they’re just try­ing to prop it up, prop up their div­i­dends until they recov­er.

Tony  1:01:04

Yeah, I mean, it’s, I’m kind of skim­ming over this. But oth­er things which might be a prob­lem is if, for exam­ple, they’re pay­ing the direc­tors-the direc­tors want div­i­dends because they need them for per­son­al rea­sons. So, again, I’m not that famil­iar with IGL. Not sure what the hold­ings are, let me just have a quick look at what the…

Cameron  1:01:24

But look at their, look at their earn­ings per share over the last few years too. It goes 22, 21, 21, 21, 21, 24, 9.

Tony  1:01:35

Yeah right. So, it’s like­ly to be a tem­po­rary thing, I would think. But yeah, if you look at the share­hold­ers, there’s a cou­ple of peo­ple there with 9% of the com­pa­ny which is a good thing. But they may well be bank­ing on get­ting a div­i­dend of a cer­tain amount this year for what­ev­er rea­son, and that’s why they’re dip­ping into retained earn­ings or bor­row­ings to fund it.

Cameron  1:01:59

Those pri­vate yachts aren’t going to pay for them­selves.

Tony  1:02:02

Cor­rect.

Cameron  1:02:04

All right. Thank you, Tony. Thank you, Alice. That’s it. After hours, Tony. I’ve got a sir. Oh…

Tony  1:02:13

Sor­ry. Before we get to after hours, I did want to, I just remem­bered now you asked before what I want­ed to talk about with Navexa. I now recall what it was. I think it may have been Alice who asked the ques­tion a cou­ple of weeks ago about what the aver­age hold­ing peri­od was in my expe­ri­ence. So, what I did after get­ting that ques­tion, I just recent­ly ran the Navexa dum­my port­fo­lio down­load so I could down­load the trans­ac­tions into a spread­sheet, so I could check the per­for­mance cal­cu­la­tions. But also, then went and looked at the trans­ac­tions in the port­fo­lio and found that on aver­age, over the last two and a half years, the aver­age half time for a share is six months. So, the whole port­fo­lio was being turned over on a six-month­ly basis. Although, it does get bet­ter for the shares that we cur­rent­ly hold, which is an aver­age hold­ing peri­od of nine months. The longest share­hold­ing was two and a half years, which was PRU, Perseus ener­gy. We did sell that recent­ly though, so the longest hold­ing for the cur­rent port­fo­lio is Schaf­fer (SFC),which is 2.1 years. So, I’m think­ing what’s been hap­pen­ing is there’s been a lot of rule 1s hit­ting us dur­ing the COVID cough and even recent­ly, and that they’ve been, sort of, turn­ing over stocks more than aver­age. But, once they do set­tle into the port­fo­lio, they do stay longer with us. But yeah, it’s prob­a­bly a lit­tle bit more fre­quent than what I thought and what my port­fo­lio does, but it’s not a bad, you know — it’s a dum­my port­fo­lio, so it’s a good proxy for the last cou­ple of years for us.

Cameron  1:03:53

Yeah, and you know, we start­ed it as peo­ple know just a few months before the COVID cough hit so not sur­pris­ing it’s been a lit­tle bit more tur­bu­lent. My own port­fo­lio over the last few years which I would’ve start­ed in around about the same time is very much the same; a lot of real 1s for a peri­od there but then it all set­tled in and now it’s just kind of rock­ing on.

Tony  1:04:17

Yeah, so once they do, sort of, take hold they tend to stay a lot longer. But yeah, so this is sug­gest­ing six months on aver­age. My port­fo­lio is sug­gest­ing more like half the port­fo­lio turn­ing over in six months, so some­where in between those two is prob­a­bly going to be the aver­age.

Cameron  1:27:02

QAV Pod­cast is a pro­duc­tion of space craft pub­lish­ing pro­pri­ety lim­it­ed autho­rised rep­re­sen­ta­tive of AFSL 520442 AFS rep­re­sen­ta­tive num­ber 001292718. Please don’t make any invest­ment deci­sions based sole­ly on lis­ten­ing to this pod­cast. This is pre­sent­ed as gen­er­al advice only not per­son­al finan­cial advice. We don’t know your per­son­al finan­cial cir­cum­stances. Please see a finan­cial plan­ner before mak­ing any invest­ing deci­sions.

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