Transcription QAV 352 — Groundhog Day

File Name: QAV 352 Club — Ground­hog Day

File Length: 01:07:32

Cameron Reil­ly [00:04]: Wel­come back to QAV, Tony Kynas­ton, Episode 352, Sea­son 3, 52. And depend­ing on who you believe, your pre­dic­tion that Don­ald Trump would win the elec­tion is wrong, or it was com­plete­ly right and it was stolen from him. If you want to know more, just turn up to the Four Sea­sons Land­scap­ing Car Park this after­noon, where Rudy Giu­liani will be giv­ing anoth­er press con­fer­ence.

Tony Kynas­ton [00:35]: Yeah, well, you know, I was wrong in pre­dict­ing Trump, but I think my math was still pret­ty good.

Cameron Reil­ly [00:41]: It was pret­ty, pret­ty bloody close, man.

Tony Kynas­ton [00:43]: It was. Was­n’t it? That’s the biggest turnout in vot­ing his­to­ry, which means even though Biden was 4 mil­lion vot­ers more than Trump, Trump was the sec­ond biggest turnout in vot­ing his­to­ry. And my math was, he had rock-sol­id 38% sup­port. I did some num­bers over the week­end and I think some­thing like 250 mil­lion Amer­i­cans are able to vote. So they are 18 or old­er. And so 38% of that was some­thing like around, just in the low nineties. And he got 70. So he got a lot of his sup­port­ers out there and 70 would have been enough to win. I think almost every oth­er elec­tion in Amer­i­can his­to­ry.

Cameron Reil­ly [01:26]: I just can’t believe. I think the last time in 2016, he got 63 mil­lion votes. So 7 mil­lion extra peo­ple had a look at the last four years and went, “Yeah, yeah, that’s…”

Tony Kynas­ton [01:40]: “Yeah, give me more.”

Cameron Reil­ly [01:40]: “Give me more of that. That’s great. That’s what we want.” No, I’m sure a lot of peo­ple, I’m sure a lot of the Democ­rats who vot­ed for Biden, did­n’t like Biden real­ly. They just, it was a vote against Trump. I’m sure the oppo­site is true. A lot of peo­ple who vot­ed for Trump, a lot of Repub­li­cans don’t like Trump per se but don’t like the prospect of a Demo­c­ra­t­ic admin­is­tra­tion because there will be abor­tions hap­pen­ing on every street cor­ner and they’ll take their guns and there’ll be taxed back at 92% like they were in the good old days. But as…

Tony Kynas­ton [02:17]: Well, I think it’s more than that Cameron, Biden has to be aware of this. It’s peo­ple who are say­ing, a bit like Queens­land did dur­ing the Aus­tralian elec­tion and they said, “You know, don’t feed us poli­cies on cli­mate change. We are coal min­ers. We need a job. Okay. If you want to talk about cli­mate change, tell us where we get a job to replace our cur­rent one.”

Cameron Reil­ly [02:35]: Yeah.

Tony Kynas­ton [02:35]: I think there’s a lot of that with the blue-col­lar work­ers who vot­ed for him.

Cameron Reil­ly [02:39]: Well, I have the answer to that. It’s well, you’re not going to have a job, but we’re just going to give you an income. We’re going to pay for it with quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing. You know, we’re going to give you a salary to replace your exist­ing salary in per­pe­tu­ity, well for the rest of your life or until your retire­ment age, because we don’t want you to mine coal any­more and we don’t have any­thing to replace it with for you. So we’ll just give you free cash. Thank you very much. Have a nice day. Easy.

Tony Kynas­ton [03:07]: And we have [inaudi­ble 00:03:08]. You might have to do a bit of work. You don’t have to go on cad­dy for Trump every now and then on the golf course.

Cameron Reil­ly [03:14]: Yeah, go, and cad­dy for Trump. But we were just laugh­ing before we start­ed the record­ing that our dum­my port­fo­lio today is up and cur­rent­ly 7.46% since the start of Sep­tem­ber. I think last week when we did the show, it was like 2%. The mar­ket, the Aus­tralian mar­ket has boomed since then. Hamish Dou­glass from Mag­el­lan told investors last week that the US elec­tion win for Biden if it is off­set by a Repub­li­can-con­trolled Sen­ate, which still remains to be seen, I think it’s sort of tied last I looked and I think there’s a runoff in Geor­gia in Jan­u­ary, but he said that would be a ‘nir­vana’ out­come for the share mar­ket. And I read some­thing else today in the Fin, some­body said Wall Street has done best under Demo­c­rat pres­i­dents with an aver­age return of 14.6% per annum since 1927, com­pared with an aver­age return under Repub­li­can pres­i­dents of 9.8% per annum. That was from Dr. Oliv­er. I’m not sure who he is but there you go. Some fundie or some­thing, I think.

Tony Kynas­ton [04:36]: Pos­si­bly Shane Oliv­er, the Head Econ­o­mists of AMP.

Cameron Reil­ly [04:39]: That sounds, right. Yeah. Is AMP still a thing? Oh, okay.

Tony Kynas­ton [04:44]: Not for much longer.


Cameron Reil­ly [04:45]: All right.

Tony Kynas­ton [04:46]: I don’t think. Yeah.

Cameron Reil­ly [04:47]: So yeah, there you go. How­ev­er, I think this is Dr. Oliv­er again, the best aver­age result has actu­al­ly occurred when there’s been a Demo­c­rat pres­i­dent and Repub­li­can con­trol of the house, the Sen­ate, or both. This has seen an aver­age return of 16.4% per annum. So, there you go. The mar­ket seems to be hap­py with the out­come any­way, so far.

Tony Kynas­ton [05:11]: Well, I hope that’s right. And if we can get a dou­ble mar­ket, we’ll be very hap­py, won’t we?

Cameron Reil­ly [05:16]: Yes.

Tony Kynas­ton [05:17]: All things to Joe Biden, we should have sup­port­ed J. David Markham since it was in our best inter­est finan­cial­ly.

Cameron Reil­ly [05:25]: No one knows who you’re talk­ing about on this show, Tony. So the joke goes in the…

Tony Kynas­ton [05:29]: [inaudi­ble 00:05:29] Demo­c­rat friends.

Cameron Reil­ly [05:33]: Yeah. Crazy, crazy Demo­c­rat. Just as crazy as a Trump Repub­li­can. He is but on the oth­er side. But we love him any­way. So that’s the US elec­tion news out of the way for this week. Let’s talk about your Mel­bourne Cup tip, just in the same vein as your pre­dic­tion that Trump would win the elec­tion last week. Your pre­dic­tion about who was the horse. I can’t even, I’ve blocked it out of my mem­o­ry. I lost so much mon­ey on it.

Tony Kynas­ton [06:01]: I was lis­ten­ing to the last Show and you cut it off before I gave my tips. So for those peo­ple, it was Twi­light Pay­ment.

Cameron Reil­ly [06:08]: Ah! Yeah. That was delib­er­ate to make you look good. Yeah. To save your rep­u­ta­tion.

Tony Kynas­ton [06:13]: We had the record­ing glitch before I could give it away.

Cameron Reil­ly [06:16]: And that’s hon­est­ly what it was though. Sure, it was.

Tony Kynas­ton [06:20]: The Twi­light Pay­ment one. No, I tip Russ­ian Camelot which ran eighth.

Cameron Reil­ly [06:26]: Yeah. At least it did­n’t end up hav­ing to be shot. No, was that Van Dyck or some­thing?

Tony Kynas­ton [06:30]: Antho­ny Van Dyck. Yeah. Very sad. I think there’ll be a lot of soul search­ing done by writ­ing Vic­to­ria to try and fix that prob­lem because it always seems to be the over­seas hors­es in the Mel­bourne Cup that come to a crop­per. And it’s nev­er a good look for the indus­try. It’s not a good thing for the hors­es. And if you just want­ed to be cold-blood­ed about it, it’s a finan­cial loss for the own­ers. So, I think, you know, action will be tak­en to fix that.

Cameron Reil­ly [07:00]: Your horse too, ran, was it in the Cox? Was it the Cox you had a horse in last week?

Tony Kynas­ton [07:07]: No, not the Cox Plate.

Cameron Reil­ly [07:09]: Oaks?

Tony Kynas­ton [07:09]: No, we had a horse race on Oaks Day, in a sprint race on Oaks Day, ran fourth. 

Cameron Reil­ly [07:14]: Yeah.

Tony Kynas­ton [07:15]: I know if the uni­verse isn’t giv­ing me many…Well, it gave us Joe Biden so I can’t com­plain. Maybe all those things will bal­ance out. Maybe it’s kar­ma.

Cameron Reil­ly [07:21]: I think I’m down 50 bucks on your horse tips so far Tony. It’s a good thing the mar­kets are [laugh­ter 00:07:21].

Tony Kynas­ton [07:30]: Yeah. Take with the left hand. Give with the right. But that’s a good thing. I mean, the worst thing for some­one who’s just start­ing out in the bet­ting mar­ket is to have a big win at the start because then they just think…

Cameron Reil­ly [07:43]: You get cocky.

Tony Kynas­ton [07:46]: It’s a lot. Yeah.

Cameron Reil­ly [07:47]: You’re delib­er­ate­ly los­ing me mon­ey. I see. It’s all part of the plan. I appre­ci­ate that. The oth­er thing big news I want­ed to talk about this week is the Reserve Bank has decid­ed that Aus­tralia is now well and tru­ly in the quan­ti­ta­tive easing/MMT camp.

Tony Kynas­ton [08:06] Yeah. I mean, [inaudi­ble 00:08:07], I guess they have to do it just to be com­pet­i­tive with the rest of the world. If they don’t do it, then, you know, a dol­lar ris­es, which hurts imports, et cetera. But when I saw it, I thought let’s invert this, what would Aus­tralia and the econ­o­my be like if inter­est rates here were still 4 or 5%. And I think we would­n’t be see­ing prop­er­ty bub­bles. We would­n’t be see­ing stock mar­ket bub­bles, espe­cial­ly in the tech-stock sec­tor. We would have a retire­ment cohort that can put their mon­ey in the bank and live off the div­i­dends. And the flip side would be, you have a lot of for­eign invest­ment fly­ing into Aus­tralia to buy our bonds or to put mon­ey into our banks. And that’s got to be a good thing as well. So I’m not nec­es­sar­i­ly con­vinced about cut­ting inter­est rates and it is good for the econ­o­my per­son­al­ly. I think we’ve cut so far that any more cuts don’t have much of an impact on us.

Cameron Reil­ly [09:10]: So, I had to read through this a cou­ple of times to get my head around it, but my under­stand­ing, tell me if you agree, is that the Reserve Bank even announced that they are going to buy pret­ty much any and all gov­ern­ment bonds as a hun­dred, I think is a hun­dred bil­lion dol­lars over the next some­thing like six months. And they’re going to keep buy­ing them for I think four years. So the gov­ern­ment cre­ates a bond, it sells the bonds to insti­tu­tion­al investors, and then the RBA turns around and buys them off the insti­tu­tion­al investors, giv­ing mon­ey to the insti­tu­tion­al investors, which then is sup­posed to make its way as cheap mon­ey into the mar­ket­place to fund busi­ness loans, et cetera, et cetera. Is that how it works?

Tony Kynas­ton [10:09]: Yeah, pret­ty much. Except for the last part often falls down and the mon­ey does­n’t flow any­where past the bal­ance sheet of the invest­ment banks. But yeah, that’s pret­ty much how it works. And the oth­er thing you left out was the Reserve Bank pays for it with a bal­ance sheet trans­ac­tion. There’s nev­er any bor­row­ings by the Reserve Bank or extra fund­ing from the gov­ern­ment to buy the bonds. They just buy them.

Cameron Reil­ly [10:32]: Where does the Reserve Bank get the mon­ey from to buy them?

Tony Kynas­ton [10:35]: It does­n’t that’s the whole point. That’s the whole point of MMT. It’s prob­a­bly the only case of dou­ble-entry book­keep­ing in the world where you don’t have a cred­it with a deb­it.

Cameron Reil­ly [10:45]: It just cre­ates the mon­ey.

Tony Kynas­ton [10:48]: Cor­rect. It’s called bal­ance sheet expan­sion. So they’ve popped these bonds on their bal­ance sheet, which has made their bal­ance sheet big­ger, but they haven’t used any mon­ey to real­ly buy them. Well, they have had to pay the peo­ple for the bonds, but they can do that some­how. I don’t real­ly under­stand the account­ing treat­ment of it. And then they ware­house those bonds and they’ve got a plan to sell them at some stage in the future, which if you look at Japan could be 30 or 40 years down the track and get their mon­ey back and then it just dis­ap­pears again. But it’s a very strange account­ing treat­ment.

Cameron Reil­ly [11:23]: I think it’s time we play this clip again.

[Snip­pet] [11:27]: Thank you very much for your time tonight. It’s my great plea­sure to be with you. You’re an econ­o­mist work­ing in the bank­ing sec­tor, yeah? I am. Should I get a lawyer? I think I’m enti­tled to legal rep­re­sen­ta­tion. No, no, no, no. These are just a few sim­ple ques­tions. Sim­ple ques­tions, how sim­ple? Well, they’re the­o­ret­i­cal. The­o­ret­i­cal. I can deal. Yeah. Okay. We can deal with that. I mean, don’t hold me to the answers, but. Why not? Well, because I’m an econ­o­mist and I can think of a dif­fer­ent set of cir­cum­stances under which my respons­es might vary some­what. And every­thing’s con­nect­ed to every­thing else is it? In eco­nom­ics, I’m afraid, that is the glob­al fear right at the moment. Yeah. Right. There’s a lot of uncer­tain­ty in world eco­nom­ics. There is a great deal of uncer­tain­ty and a lack of con­fi­dence. Yeah. And there’s a lot of talk of quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing. Quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing, yes. It’s a term we hear all the time. That’s a term you hear a lot at the moment.

What exact­ly is quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing? Well, I can answer this because actu­al­ly, we’re advis­ing a cou­ple of gov­ern­ments about this right at the moment. And what are you say­ing to them? Well, in fact, I should just take you through what we’re telling them to do. Yeah. Show me…I won’t go into a lot of detail. I’m being dis­crete, but this will give you an idea of how quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing works. Yeah. Take the print­er out of the box and place it on the table with the out tray fac­ing the win­dow. The out tray fac­ing the win­dow. That’s right. Load paper into the paper recep­ta­cle and place cur­ren­cy on glass tray F. Right. Check the align­ment by print­ing out a test page. Right. Go into copy set­tings and select dou­ble-sided and the num­ber of copies you require. How many would you sug­gest? In the case of one of our clients, it’s 80 bil­lion, 120 bil­lion in the case of anoth­er client, and one client wants a tril­lion of these things. Can you get print­ers to do that? No, you can’t. You’re going to need a bank of them. I mean, it’s a mul­ti-print­er job. You need some big ones. Big indus­tri­al strings. Yeah. Yeah. Big, like a, [inaudi­ble 00:13:00], all fac­ing the win­dow. Yeah. Yeah.

Once you’ve ascer­tained that you have the align­ment, cor­rect? Yeah. You alert the bank­ing sec­tor, open the win­dow, and press copy. And stand well back. Yes, you got to stand well back because they can cre­ate a bit of a vac­u­um while reach­ing cruis­ing height, where­abouts in the Super­fund Indus­try very often. And you’d have to con­sid­er the wind direc­tion too. Oh, you don’t want to be doing this upwind. No, because you’d be cov­ered in pre­tend mon­ey. You could get cov­ered in what? Pre­tend mon­ey. No, this is not pre­tend mon­ey. This is real cur­ren­cy we’re cre­at­ing. Don’t you just print it off? I mean, these are pho­to­copies aren’t they? Excuse me, Dave, this is not going to work because I’ve just explained it to a bloke and he saw through it straight away. Are you in bank­ing? No. He’s not even in the bank­ing record. Okay. I’ll try that. Try what? Have you ever heard of Rumpel­stilt­skin? No. Good. Now we’re get­ting some­where to pull up a chair. I’ll tell you a tale.

Cameron Reil­ly [13:51]: That was nine years ago. The Clark and Dawes Show. There you go is still rel­e­vant today. Just open up the win­dow and print mon­ey.

Tony Kynas­ton [14:02]: Because of [inaudi­ble 00:14:02]. I love that one.

Cameron Reil­ly [14:06]: So, there you go, Aus­tralia, just our econ­o­my is doing so great, Tony. So great. We’ve dropped inter­est rates to 0.1% and we’re just print­ing a hun­dred bil­lion dol­lars of mon­ey. Good times.

Tony Kynas­ton [14:24]: Yeah. And the share mar­kets have gone up 5 or 6% today, so it’s all good. And that reminds me too that peo­ple will need to change their copy of our QAV spread­sheet because inter­est rates have been cut. So the hur­dle rate we use for our IV2 cal­cu­la­tion is now 6.1% down from 6.5. And our hur­dle rate for a com­pa­ny’s yield being above bank debt has come down as well. And I’ll put that num­ber in the Stock Jour­nal. I think it was now 2.68, which was about the cheap­est Big Four bank mort­gage I could find when I did a search today.

Cameron Reil­ly [15:06]: Wow. Good time to bor­row lots and lots and lots of mon­ey.

Tony Kynas­ton [15:09]: It is. Isn’t it? Exact­ly. And I will feel real­ly pissed off if we get to the end of this eco­nom­ic cycle if we ever do and we haven’t got, you know, top-notch hos­pi­tals and schools on every cor­ner and four-lane high­ways through our cities because the gov­ern­ment should be bor­row­ing every cent it can too with inter­est rates this low.

Cameron Reil­ly [15:29]:  And got­ten rid of the coal indus­try and just giv­en all those peo­ple, what do they call it? There’s a name for that.

Tony Kynas­ton [15:36]: Trump cad­dy.

Cameron Reil­ly [15:36]: Uni­ver­sal basic income, UBI.

Tony Kynas­ton [15:39]: Trump cad­dy.

Cameron Reil­ly [15:40]: UBI/Trump Cad­dy. Yeah. Let’s talk about…

Tony Kynas­ton [15:45]: Yeah, well that’s right. I mean, they should be if it was a dif­fer­ent polit­i­cal per­sua­sion and our gov­ern­ment stands alone in the world now. Even the US with Biden is say­ing, they’re going to be, you know, elim­i­nat­ing their car­bons by 2040. I think that was the num­ber, the date, you know, we should be bor­row­ing and build­ing solar pow­er farms across all the deserts in the mid­dle of Aus­tralia. It’s just stag­ger­ing that we’re not future-proof­ing our econ­o­my and future-proof­ing our future.

Cameron Reil­ly [16:14]: Maybe Chi­na might help us down that path soon. Say­ing, “You know what? We’re not buy­ing any­more of your coal.” Con­grat­u­la­tions on align­ing your­selves with Trump, Aus­tralia. Good luck with that. You’re now all alone. Let’s talk about …

Tony Kynas­ton [16:31]: It isn’t.


Cameron Reil­ly [16:33]: Sor­ry.

Tony Kynas­ton [16:34]: I was just going to make a point there. It is inter­est­ing because the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment is talk­ing about ban­ning all of our imports at the moment. It reminds me of that Harts­field Land­ing episode that Aaron Sorkin re-wrote recent­ly and aired on one of the stream­ing ser­vices, which was real­ly good. And Pres­i­dent Bart­let was play­ing chess with Sam Seaborne and the Chi­nese were send­ing bat­tle­cruis­ers into this, I think it was the Chi­na Sea because Tai­wan was about to have its first free elec­tion. And they did­n’t like that. Bart­let kept very cru­el and kept say­ing see the whole board. The same. He was wor­ried that there’s going to be a mil­i­tary con­flict because Bart­let was send­ing the US car­ri­ers in to block the Chi­nese. And of course, the Chi­nese were after some­thing com­plete­ly else. They want­ed some oth­er con­ces­sion that they were nego­ti­at­ing as well. And I can’t help but think the tim­ing of this move by Chi­na against their imports coin­cides with the White House chang­ing pow­er. And they just basi­cal­ly, you know, fir­ing a shot across [inaudi­ble 00:17:37] and say, you know, be very care­ful what you do with the new pres­i­dent when he comes knock­ing and ask­ing you for your sup­port.

Cameron Reil­ly [17:44]: Yeah. Well, I think it all got tied up in the trade war and Trump try­ing to blame COVID on Chi­na and [inaudi­ble 00:17:53] jump­ing on board the beat-up Chi­na thing and I’m sure [inaudi­ble 00:17:56] had his own eco­nom­ic incen­tives for doing that. Maybe thought he would get some­thing more out of the Trump admin­is­tra­tion but, any­way, not good. Not good for Aus­tralian exporters.

Tony Kynas­ton [18:08]: Not good at all. No.

Cameron Reil­ly [18:10]: Let’s talk about the CAA Con­sol­i­da­tion, Tony. We pur­chased this stock only a cou­ple of weeks ago, and it’s just gone through one for 30 con­sol­i­da­tions. Can you explain to me why they did that and what it means for us as investors in CAA?

Tony Kynas­ton [18:32]: Well, effec­tive­ly it means noth­ing to us as investors. They just mul­ti­plied the share price by 30 and divid­ed the num­ber of shares on issue by 30. So if peo­ple out there lis­ten­ing who have bought CAA shares, they should expect a noti­fi­ca­tion from the reg­istry say­ing that the num­ber of shares that they hold has gone down by 30. But if they check the price, it’s gone up by 30. I don’t sub­scribe to these kinds of things. I think it’s bad psy­chol­o­gy. But it’s basi­cal­ly psy­chol­o­gy that is used to jus­ti­fy this. And CAA came out and said that they thought hav­ing a 15 cent share price was keep­ing peo­ple from invest­ing in them because peo­ple are quite a low share price with a small com­pa­ny, even though that’s not the case with CAA. And they also came out and said that their share price, because it was so small was being, they trad­ed too much. And I’m not sure if that’s a good thing or a bad thing or, or real­ly means any­thing real­ly. But that was their rea­son­ing for doing the con­sol­i­da­tion. So now their share price is around $5 where it was around 15 cents before.

Cameron Reil­ly [19:43]: We need to tell them that it’s not how big it is, it’s what you do with it that counts.

Tony Kynas­ton [19:49]: That’s right. And that’s always been the, like peo­ple crit­i­cize Buf­fett for years for hav­ing a share price that was so big peo­ple could­n’t invest in it. And he always said, it does­n’t mat­ter. That’s what it is. I’m not going to split it just to make it more liq­uid. If you want to buy it, buy one. And then of course, what hap­pened was Wall Street being Wall Street, peo­ple set up funds and bought Berk­shire Hath­away shares at a cou­ple hun­dred thou­sand dol­lars each and then sold shares in the fund for a hun­dred dol­lars a share. So basi­cal­ly peo­ple could buy frac­tion­al own­er­ship of a Berk­shire Hath­away share for a hun­dred dol­lars and Buf­fett did­n’t like the fact that peo­ple in Wall Street weren’t ben­e­fit­ing from that. So he actu­al­ly did issue what’s called baby books. So you can’t buy Berk­shire B shares. I think there were 1/300th of the price of the Berk­shire share and you get all the same ben­e­fits of that. Your votes worth 1/300th of a vote at the Berk­shire Hath­away AGM. They don’t pay a div­i­dend, so there’s no impact on the div­i­dends, but yeah, sim­i­lar sort of psy­chol­o­gy.


Cameron Reil­ly [20:52]: They get to turn up to get an invite to the AGM?

Tony Kynas­ton [20:55]: Yeah, you do get to turn up.

Cameron Reil­ly [20:57]:  Wow. All right, now this week we promised we would make time to talk about the Kel­ly’s Heroes Cri­te­ri­on, a.k.a the Neg­a­tive Waves. Did you want to do that before or after we do our Q and A for the week?

Tony Kynas­ton [21:13]: Let’s do it before. But before we do that, I’ve got two more things to talk about and we’ve touched on them already. So just let me cir­cle back on CAA and Sand­fire. So Capral Alu­minum, I felt uneasy about the answer I gave to the ques­tion, which I think may have come from Brett last week. I’m not sure about whether CAA was a good invest­ment because it was an alu­mini­um man­u­fac­tur­er and there­fore aris­ing alu­mini­um price would be its input cost. I said it, I did­n’t think it real­ly mat­tered because they would be able to raise prices as well. And just to elab­o­rate on that if they’re able to raise prices and you expect that they prob­a­bly will, if they are get­ting a 10% prof­it based on what­ev­er their sales are now and the sales go up whol­ly and sole­ly because of their input prices go up.

So say, they’re mak­ing a hun­dred mil­lion dol­lars in sales now, the alu­mini­um price dou­bles, and they have to put their prices up and so sales go to $200 mil­lion. Then their prof­it per­cent­age goes up even though they’re still pay­ing more for their alu­mini­um. So it can have a ben­e­fit to a com­pa­ny just, I guess, because of the math. But who­ev­er asked that ques­tion last week was com­plete­ly right. What prob­a­bly not going to hap­pen with CAA is we’re not going to see that flow through from sales to bot­tom-line prof­it increase that we would see if CAA was a smelter of alu­mini­um and the input was baux­ite in the out­put was alu­mini­um. 


And I spoke about that last week too, where a resource com­pa­ny can be won­der­ful­ly lever­aged if it’s oper­at­ing costs are low enough so that when the price of the com­mod­i­ty goes up, any addi­tion­al sale flows through almost as com­plete­ly as a hun­dred per­cent prof­it to its bot­tom line. So I did actu­al­ly, when I was talk­ing about CAA, thought that they oper­at­ed the alu­mini­um smelter in Gove but I think I got that wrong. So, apolo­gies to peo­ple if I mis­led them. I think CAA will still go up with the ris­ing alu­mini­um price, but I don’t think it’ll be a gang­buster sort of increase because it does­n’t have a smelter, which I was mis­tak­en­ly think­ing that they did. I don’t think we should sell CAA by the way, it was still always on our buy­ers’ list. So it was always a qual­i­ty com­pa­ny with good val­ue. So I’m not say­ing we should sell it but I just want­ed to give a bet­ter answer to that ques­tion last week.

Cameron Reil­ly [23:40]: He did give it a bit of a nudge though. You gave it a fudge nudge last week.

Tony Kynas­ton [23:45]: A fudge nudge in what way?

Cameron Reil­ly [23:49]: Well, it was­n’t at the top of our list, I think. We remem­ber we had GRI. You said let’s sell GRI and buy CAA because the alu­mini­um price is going up.

Tony Kynas­ton [23:59]: Cor­rect. And that was on the basis that I thought it had a smelter as part of its busi­ness, but it does­n’t.

Cameron Reil­ly [24:03]: Right. 

Tony Kynas­ton [24:04]: So, yeah, so that was my mis­take.

Cameron Reil­ly [24:06]: But we’re going to hold onto it any­way.

Tony Kynas­ton [24:07]: Then I’m pre­pared to wear it.

Cameron Reil­ly [24:08]: Yep. Okay. Yeah.

Tony Kynas­ton [24:09]: Yeah, it’s still on our buy­er list. 

Cameron Reil­ly [24:10]: Right.

Tony Kynas­ton [24:11]: And the sec­ond thing I want­ed to talk about was Sand­fire because as we allud­ed to the Chi­nese. I don’t think the Chi­nese gov­ern­ment has come out and said, they’re not going to buy cop­per from Aus­tralia. But there’s cer­tain­ly been lots of reports around that peo­ple are say­ing that, either in the indus­try or in those parts of Chi­na that deal with imports. So we could have a prob­lem with it. Sand­fire came out last or towards the end of last week, Fri­day or Sat­ur­day, and said that they would be able to find oth­er cus­tomers and they have oth­er cus­tomers that Chi­na isn’t their only cus­tomer and they could trans­fer sales to oth­er peo­ple. So it may not be a prob­lem. And cer­tain­ly, Sand­fire has gone up today in line with the mar­ket. So that’s a good thing, but I just want­ed to high­light the fact that just like my Mel­bourne Cup Tips, the uni­verse has gone against me in the same week that I nom­i­nat­ed a stock to peo­ple to have a look at.

Cameron Reil­ly [25:10]: All right. Well, let’s talk about Kel­ly’s Heroes Cri­te­ri­on.

Tony Kynas­ton [25:17]: Kel­ly. Yeah. So, Kel­ly Cri­te­ri­on. So I’ve been want­i­ng to talk about this for a while. And the rea­son is that it’s prob­a­bly the clos­est thing I’ve come to any sort of sci­ence in terms of how much to put into one par­tic­u­lar pur­chase in our port­fo­lio and there­fore to give us a num­ber of stocks to buy in the port­fo­lio. So before I get to what that math is, let me give you some back­ground. The sto­ry goes way back to, I think either pre-World War II, or maybe just after World War II with a guy called Claude Shan­non. Claude Shan­non did a lot of research for Bell Labs in terms of improv­ing sig­nal recep­tion. So back in the days when bat­tle­ships were com­mu­ni­cat­ing with the fleet com­mand or prime min­is­ters were try­ing to call pres­i­dents and they were doing it over old land­lines and per­haps radio trans­mit­ters and things like that, often­times the sig­nals would be cor­rupt­ed and it was Claude Shan­non’s research which helped to improve the trans­fer of those com­mu­ni­ca­tions by putting some maths around at what lev­el is the noise in the sig­nal so much that you have to go back and ask for a resend of the trans­mis­sion and there­fore the lev­el that the sig­nal can go through and you can do a bit of work on the sig­nal to give it a boost and it will come through clear­ly.

And that math has appli­ca­tions, not just in sig­nal­ing. It was a guy called John Kel­ly who worked that out and also a guy called Edward O. Thor­pe. There’s a great book called For­tune’s For­mu­la, which goes through all this his­to­ry. And the open­ing chap­ter out­lines an old con that used to hap­pen in Chica­go, back in the twen­ties and thir­ties called The Wire. And what it was is that peo­ple would set up a fake bet­ting shop, or maybe even use a real bet­ting shop. And they would run a tele­phone line from the race­track to the bet­ting shop. And then they would some­how do a record­ing of the radio and then replay it a minute late so that peo­ple in their bet­ting shop were plac­ing bets on the rates which were already run. And the peo­ple who own the bet­ting shop call­ing you the win­ner, because they had a tele­phone line to the race­track and they could clean up because of that.

And that was also the basis of the movie The Sting. That was the con in the movie The Sting. And then the ques­tion that they had to ask from time to time was if the sig­nal com­ing down the line from the race­track in Chica­go did­n’t come through clear­ly, could they bet on that race? Or should they bet a frac­tion of the mon­ey on that race? How much con­vic­tion should they have on their bet if the sig­nal was a bit gar­bled and I thought they heard the win­ner but did­n’t quite clear­ly get it. That’s where Claude Shan­non comes in and says, “Well, you can do some math around that.” And that’s where Kel­ly and Thorp came in.

Kel­ly took Shan­non’s math and said, “What I can do is I can work out the prob­a­bil­i­ty of some­thing com­ing through clear­ly.” And if you like get­ting a result from an invest­ment or plac­ing a bet on the horse race or some­thing like that by work­ing out the prob­a­bil­i­ty of it actu­al­ly occur­ring and that becomes known as the Kel­ly Cri­te­ri­on. So basi­cal­ly the math is if you take the prob­a­bil­i­ty that you’ll get a col­lec­tion or a win with what you’re doing, and you’ll mul­ti­ply it by the returns. Say what the odds are on offer and you sub­tract what the prob­a­bil­i­ty of los­ing is and how much you lose that gives you, I guess, your edge. So it’s the chance of get­ting a return, what that return will be less the chance of los­ing all your mon­ey. If that’s a pos­i­tive num­ber, that’s your edge. And then you divide that by the return and that’s called the Kel­ly Cri­te­ri­on. And that num­ber is the per­cent­age of all of your investible mon­ey that you should put onto that bet. 

Now that might sound com­pli­cat­ed because we’re talk­ing about it over a pod­cast, but if I just worked through an exam­ple. Let’s say a coin toss, a nor­mal coin toss, if it’s a nor­mal coin that’s not been manip­u­lat­ed, then you have a 50% chance of win­ning a 100%. So that’s the net result of that cal­cu­la­tion is you win 50%. But you also have a 50% chance of los­ing every­thing, which is minus 50%. And so a 50% win minus a 50% loss is zero. And if you put that over the return, if you want, which was 100%, you get zero. So Kel­ly would say you should­n’t bet any of your [inaudi­ble 00:30:18] dol­lars on a coin toss. 

How­ev­er, if we had a coin which was weight­ed, say to the head side, and the weight­ing meant that six out of 10 coin toss­es came up heads and four out of 10 coin toss­es came up tails in which case, and you always bet heads, how much should you allo­cate to the bet? And if you do the math on that, you have a 60% chance of win­ning 100% less a 40% chance of los­ing a 100%. So you have a 20% edge, 60 minus 40, and you put that over the 100% return avail­able and Kel­ly would say, you should be bet­ting one-fifth of your port­fo­lio every time. And what that is attempt­ing to do and does do is not only max­i­mize your prof­it but also min­i­mize your risk. There’s a whole branch of math­e­mat­ics now devot­ed to this kind of thing. One of the devel­op­ers of this the­o­ry was a guy called Markov. And often­times, if you plot these kinds of poten­tial returns and odds of get­ting those returns on the graph the point where you max­i­mize your return and min­i­mize your risk of los­ing is called the Markov point or the Markov curve or the effi­cient mon­ey fron­tier some­times. But it’s the best chance of max­i­miz­ing your returns with­out los­ing every­thing.

And Thor­pe, I’ll just quick­ly touch on, took that con­cept of bet­ting more when the odds were in your favor to the Black­jack and worked out the odds of every poten­tial hand that was dealt in the Black­jack game. He real­ized that if you put more mon­ey out when you had a high chance of win­ning Black­jack, you made more mon­ey than if you put a small­er bet out. When you have a low­er chance of win­ning Black­jack, you would lose less mon­ey and there­fore do bet­ter over time. And the way he did that was if you played Black­jack in the old days at a casi­no, they play it with one deck of cards. And if you would count the cards as they were being dealt either to you or to oth­er play­ers or the deal­er, you could work out by a very sim­ple for­mu­la of just say­ing, if the card still has a val­ue of 10, so it’s a 10 of dia­monds or hearts or what­ev­er, or it’s a pic­ture card, Jack, Queen, King or a 10, give that card being dealt and a num­ber of plus one or a score of plus one. And if it’s some­thing else, give it a score of minus one. And then as you being dealt, you just go plus one, minus one, plus one, plus one, plus one. Okay. It’s plus three, minus one. You count it as it’s com­ing out. When the score goes very neg­a­tive, it means the chances of get­ting a 10 in the future because the pack is always dwin­dling gets high­er and high­er. And that’s what you want when you’re play­ing Black­jack either because you’ve drawn an Ace, you want to get a pic­ture card to make it 21, or even just two tens is 20, which is the next best score.

So Thorp took that idea of invest­ing more when the odds were in your favor to Vegas and made a lot of mon­ey play­ing Black­jack and was even bankrolled by some Texas mil­lion­aires to play on their behalf with lots of mon­ey. And then even­tu­al­ly he was barred from the casi­nos for count­ing cards and changed the whole indus­try. So now, if you walk into a casi­no like Crown Casi­no, you will find that they don’t play with one deck of cards. They play with usu­al­ly eight or some­times 16 decks of cards and they use a machine to shuf­fle them all the time. So it’s very hard to work out at what stage in the draw you are, and whether there are more tens left in the deck to be dealt with or less and there­fore to change a bit. Thorp then took that idea and he wrote a book about it called…Well, first of all, he wrote a book called Beat the Deal­er about Black­jack, which became known as the basic strat­e­gy of card play. And then he wrote a book called Beat the Mar­ket, and he took Kel­ly’s the­o­ry and his adap­tion of it to the share mar­ket and died a wealthy man.

But what Thorp did and what he did in his book Beat the Mar­ket was to arbi­trage options. So he was able to find that there was an edge at some times in the mar­ket between what the com­pa­ny share price was ver­sus what an option on the future share price of that com­pa­ny was. And so he played an arbi­trage game when the edge got big enough, he bet big. And if it was too small, he left it alone. And again that does­n’t real­ly exist today. That sort of arbi­trage has been trad­ed out of the mar­ket large­ly because the mar­ket is much more dig­i­tal and infor­ma­tion flows much quick­er these days. But the con­cepts of those two things still hold. So that’s basi­cal­ly the Kel­ly Cri­te­ri­on.

What it means in terms of our invest­ments? I’ve always strug­gled with that math in apply­ing it to the share mar­ket because well, one way to do it would be to say that what’s our prob­a­bil­i­ty of get­ting a win with our next invest­ment. We could work that out his­tor­i­cal­ly by count­ing up how many times we’ve bought a stock and it’s gone up ver­sus how many times we bought the stock and it’s gone down. We could do that with our dum­my port­fo­lio and I can do it with mine and lis­ten­ers can do it with theirs. 

If we take the sort of num­ber that I usu­al­ly quote, which is six out of 10, right? Then we have a 60% chance of the next stock we buy being prof­itable for us. And then the next ques­tion is what’s that prof­it? I’m not quite sure what to put in here. But if we said it was 20% because that’s rough­ly what we get over time, then we have a 60% chance of win­ning a 20% return from our next share invest­ment. And then we have a 40% chance of los­ing mon­ey and because of the way we invest, we don’t lose every­thing. So let’s say it was 20%. Then we have 60% of 20% is 12 and 40% of 20% is eight. So we have a 4% edge. Our return we said was 20%. So that’s again one fifth. 

So that basi­cal­ly says if we fol­lowed, if my math was cor­rect­ly applied and I’ve always had the ques­tion mark over if that’s the right way to do it or not because the returns in the stock mar­ket are a lot more flu­id and we could be going through a patch where six­ty out of 10 does­n’t apply, even though over the long-term his­tor­i­cal­ly it has. But that would say we should have a port­fo­lio of five shares. So one-fifth of our mon­ey should be put into the share mar­ket with each share pur­chase.

And that may be the right sort of thing to do. I’m not absolute­ly con­fi­dent with my appli­ca­tion of the Kel­ly for­mu­la. And what his­to­ry has shown with using Kel­ly to do this kind of thing, or to go to the race­track or to go to the casi­no or what­ev­er is that you can still suf­fer a run of loss­es, which can wipe you out or take you down to a very low num­ber. So to use that exam­ple before about the weight­ed coin toss, where you’re putting 20% out, you can still have more than four times in the row, even though it’s weight­ed to go heads. But if you put out 20% of your port­fo­lio, say you start­ed with a thou­sand bucks. You put out 200 on the first hand, or the first toss of the coin you’ll lose. You’ve got $800 left. So you put out 160 on the next one you’ll lose. Say you’ve got 640 left or 620 left. So you put out 134 on the next one and you’ll lose. And if that goes on for five or six times, you’re get­ting right down to a very small num­ber. You’re not los­ing every­thing because your pool’s dimin­ish­ing and you’re tak­ing 20% of the new pool each time. But it gets down to a small num­ber that takes a long time to grow back up from that small num­ber. So that’s one prob­lem with Kel­ly.

And the oth­er prob­lem is that once you, if it works for you and you get up to some very large num­bers, if you start­ed with a thou­sand and sud­den­ly you’ve played for weeks and weeks and weeks, and you’re at a hun­dred thou­sand dol­lars, then putting a $20,000 on a toss of a coin can be a very hard thing to do. So you might want to mod­i­fy Kel­ly at that stage and they some­times talk about using frac­tion­al Kel­ly, half Kel­ly or quar­ter Kel­ly when you get to that stage. So you’re not los­ing sub­stan­tial parts of your port­fo­lio which you’re putting at risk because your pool has got­ten very large. So I hope that makes sense.

Cameron Reil­ly [38:51]: You end up just fudg­ing Kel­ly. It’s a Kel­ly fudge.

Tony Kynas­ton [38:54]: That’s a Kel­ly fudge. That’s right. So I find that very inter­est­ing and it’s great it’s math­e­mat­i­cal, but I do have dif­fi­cul­ties apply­ing it to the share mar­ket.

Cameron Reil­ly [39:04]: Yeah, well, my first com­ment is the exam­ple you gave of los­ing all your mon­ey on the bets just makes me think of horserac­ing tak­ing your tips. But sec­ond­ly, I’m going to start call­ing you Kel­ly.

Tony Kynas­ton [39:22]: Hey, there’s a neg­a­tive way to that. It’s a beau­ti­ful bridge. That’s going to be there.

Cameron Reil­ly [39:28]:  Yeah. Well, also there are hors­es out there, man. I keep wait­ing for the horse. Yeah. When I first read through Kel­ly, when you men­tioned it six months ago or what­ev­er it was to me the first time, and I read through a cou­ple of Investo­pe­dia arti­cles and Wikipedia arti­cles and that kind of stuff, that was my first reac­tion as well. How do I cal­cu­late what the upside of a stock is and what the risk is? We don’t real­ly know. But you should be able to regres­sion test that fair­ly eas­i­ly. Right? If you go back, if you went back over your buys over the last 20 years, you’d be able to say, okay, what if I just bought five instead of 20 and see how it plays out?

Tony Kynas­ton [40:09]: Yeah, well, I’ve done that. In fact, at one stage Kel­ly for me was work­ing out to be two stocks. I went back and regres­sion test­ed that and it actu­al­ly came out to be the same sort of num­ber, like 15 to 20% over the long-term.

Cameron Reil­ly [40:24]: Right.

Tony Kynas­ton [40:25]: But it had a lot more volatil­i­ty. So there were a lot of times when you were sit­ting on loss­es, wait­ing for them to turn around where­as with a big­ger port­fo­lio, you don’t notice it as much. The volatil­i­ty is a lot small­er, which is what hap­pens. The more stocks you own, the less volatile it gets. 

Cameron Reil­ly [40:39]: Yeah.

Tony Kynas­ton [40:41]: Poten­tial­ly it means you track the index mod­el or clos­er. But yeah, what I found was that a small­er port­fo­lio per­formed pret­ty much the same, but the volatil­i­ty could be stom­ach-churn­ing.

Cameron Reil­ly [40:52]: Right. Okay. So the bot­tom line is does­n’t real­ly have any appli­ca­tion. So that last 15 min­utes of going into depth are mean­ing­less, but you know, at least peo­ple know why you don’t use it now.

Tony Kynas­ton [41:10]: Well, I think it’s not mean­ing­less. I think these things are great because there could be some­one out there lis­ten­ing who’s going, “Oh, okay. That makes sense to me. I can apply it this way.” And they’ll come back and say, “You know, do this.” Just because I haven’t found a way to apply, it does­n’t mean there’s anoth­er way to apply it.

Cameron Reil­ly [41:24]: Okay. So if there’s some­one out there…

Tony Kynas­ton [41:26]: Or mod­i­fy it and do this.

Cameron Reil­ly [41:27]: We could get Mori­ar­ty back on.

Tony Kynas­ton [41:32]: And that’s essen­tial­ly what Steve Mori­ar­ty was say­ing, he was say­ing, and what Kel­ly says when the odds are in your favor if you have an edge increase your bets.

Cameron Reil­ly [41:41]: Yes. You know, Mori­ar­ty’s using the…What’s it called? I’m think­ing Gap now because we just did our inter­view with Richard Ivis was talk­ing Gap. Cape, not gap. Cape and Gap. Yes, and bas­ing it on his­tor­i­cal per­for­mance of Cape ratios, right?

Tony Kynas­ton [42:06]: Yeah. Yeah.

Cameron Reil­ly [42:08]: Okay.

Tony Kynas­ton [42:08]: And look, it might just be me, but I find all this kind of stuff real­ly fas­ci­nat­ing. The his­to­ry of finance fas­ci­nat­ing and the his­to­ry of risk­ing. And all these kinds of peo­ple who’ve tried to and have suc­cess­ful­ly used math to invest in the stock mar­ket. I think it’s great.

Cameron Reil­ly [42:22]: Yeah. It’s just you. Yeah. Well, I feel, you know, when you talk about that stuff, I feel like I’m sure Chris­sy feels when I start talk­ing about why Julius Cae­sar cross­ing the Rubi­con in 49 BCE. She’s like, “Oh my God, shut up you nerd. You know, tell me why this mat­ters?” I go, “Well, Don­ald Trump does­n’t want to go to jail. That’s why it mat­ters for the same rea­son.” I’ve got a whole anal­o­gy about Cae­sar cross­ing the Rubi­con. But any­way, I’m glad that you know this stuff because I come to you for this stuff. I’m glad that you’re a nerd, a his­to­ry finance nerd. That’s good.

Tony Kynas­ton [43:04]: Yeah. Good.

Cameron Reil­ly [43:05]: Good. All right. Well, if any­one has any ideas about how to apply Kel­ly’s Heroes’ neg­a­tive waves to invest­ing, please that isn’t Steven Mori­ar­ty, please reach out and get in con­tact and let us know what your thoughts are.

Tony Kynas­ton [43:20]: Steven’s more than wel­come to come back and talk about that.

Cameron Reil­ly [43:23]: Okay. Maybe.

Tony Kynas­ton [43:24]: He is prob­a­bly going to send us an email now and go, “You got it all wrong. That’s not right?”

Cameron Reil­ly [43:30]: Yes, prob­a­bly. All right. On the ques­tions, Brett, time on his hands, Brett. Anoth­er deep ques­tion this week. He says, “Thanks for the great show. This week loved the, like a Vir­gin ren­di­tion [inaudi­ble 00:43:49]. Dis­ap­point­ed I did­n’t think of it.” See, that’s all I’m good for. Brett is think­ing of pop tunes that go with stock names. That’s my only val­ue. He says, “I hope I did­n’t come across as crit­i­ciz­ing Tony for ques­tion­ing the sen­ti­ment. That was not my inten­tion. It would be very time-con­sum­ing to keep on top of these. And I fig­ured it as all of our QAV mem­bers jobs to raise it when we think we see a change.” And I say to Brett, no, Hey, it’s great please to chal­lenge Tony, every chance you get. Because (a) Tony some­times gets it wrong, par­tic­u­lar­ly when it comes to bet­ting on hors­es. (b) Tony loves being chal­lenged and it makes him rethink his stuff and maybe he is wrong and he can get it bet­ter. I know that that’s how you feel. So keep it up, Brett.

Tony Kynas­ton [44:40]: Yeah. So no crit­i­cism at all, Brett. And © I don’t get a chance to go across all the stocks on the watch list because there’s a cou­ple of hun­dred there now. So you’re uncov­er­ing things which I just don’t have the time to fol­low.

Cameron Reil­ly [44:52]: Yes. Sor­ry. Then we get to the sec­ond part of Bret­t’s ques­tions. He says from last week, “Sor­ry. I did not ask the ques­tion clear­ly for CCV and RXP. RXP is already on the buy­er list. I looked at the chart and it did not appear to cross the buy line. So I went through the jour­nal to find out when this occurred. It appeared in the jour­nal on the 26th of August, but it went back down before the end of the month. So it does not appear to cross look­ing back on the five-year month­ly chart. This made sense to me since a ques­tion I had last week about MYE was answered that once some­thing cross­es the buy line, it stays a buy, until it cross­es the sale line. A buy fol­lows a sale and vice ver­sa. Recent­ly, CCV also broke mid-month on the 26th of Octo­ber and went back down, which is why I was so descrip­tive on the time and day. So my ques­tion was, is CCV now a buy? Tony’s answer is no, and nei­ther is RXP. But I think he was assum­ing I was look­ing back and try­ing to jus­ti­fy or fudge both CCV and RSP. Where­as I was just draw­ing a com­par­i­son of some­thing on the watch list to some­thing that is on the buy list. Does that make sense? I guess my new ques­tion is, why is RXP on the buy list, but CCV is not? I real­ly don’t care specif­i­cal­ly about our RXP and CCV, just try­ing to under­stand the nuances of the con­cepts.” Good ques­tions, Brett.

Tony Kynas­ton [46:25]: Yeah. So I’ve just called up CCV. And it’s close. Isn’t it? I’m just look­ing at it now. I think it’s prob­a­bly right on its buy num­ber at the moment and it’s above its sale line. So, it’s poten­tial­ly a buy. So can you see you got CCV in front of you, Cam?

Cameron Reil­ly [46:47]: Just wait­ing for Stock Doc­tor to give me the big chart.


Tony Kynas­ton [46:52]: Yeah. Okay.

Cameron Reil­ly [46:54]: Yes.

Tony Kynas­ton [46:57]: It is trend­ing up since it’s lows. So [inaudi­ble 00:46:59] so the high point I’m using is March 2016 at 53 cents, 5302. And then the next high­est I’m going to use is almost the, is it the last one? The last peak? No, it’s not quite the last peak. It’s going to be there’s one in the mid­dle.

Cameron Reil­ly [47:19]: March 18th.

Tony Kynas­ton [47:21]: At March 18. Yeah. At 3865. And if I draw a line between those two peaks, it’s just about the cur­rent share price, which is today 19 cents. So I think it’s get­ting pret­ty close to being a buy­er, but I don’t think it is at the moment.

Cameron Reil­ly [47:39]: Right.

Tony Kynas­ton [47:41]: Yeah. And so I’m just look­ing at… Yeah. It looks like, okay, I’m sor­ry, I did­n’t have time to go through this ques­tion before­hand and pre-check every­thing. Bret­t’s going on to give us some three-point trend line cal­cu­lat­ed num­bers for CCV. But if I just let me call up that spread­sheet and have a look at it because that’s where I would go to, if I was try­ing to finesse what the buy price was.

Cameron Reil­ly [48:11]: I’m just look­ing at its dai­ly prices for the last month. And it got as high as 20 cents, late Octo­ber as Brett says, 28th of Octo­ber, and it’s dropped back. So, if I under­stand his ques­tion cor­rect­ly this time, because it’s breached may be just, and then dropped back, do we con­sid­er it a buy or not? And you know, I think we talked about this last week and we’ve done it before. There have been instances where shares mid-month will breach, but then by the end of the month, we’ll have fall­en back below the sell line or the buy line. And we don’t con­sid­er that a buy, if it clos­es the end of the month below the buy line, it’s not a buy regard­less of whether or not it breached mid-month.

Tony Kynas­ton [49:06]: Yes. And just to add to that, we may well have bought it when it breached mid-month. So, you know, no sweat there either. I’d stopped buy­ing it. Like I tend not to buy every­thing in one day. So chances are, I would have start­ed to buy it and stopped buy­ing it in that case. Because it would’ve gone down below the buy sig­nal again.

Cameron Reil­ly [49:24]: And in a cou­ple of instances in the QAV port­fo­lio, we’ve actu­al­ly sold some­thing a week after we’ve bought it because it fell back. And you said, we need a name for that. I don’t know what we call that.

Tony Kynas­ton [49:36]: Rule num­ber one. Don’t lose mon­ey.

Cameron Reil­ly [49:39]: Well, yeah, but when it breach­es and then it falls back down it’s, I don’t know, we need a name for that. But it was a… Yeah, we jumped too soon.

Tony Kynas­ton [49:49]: A Brett.

Cameron Reil­ly [49:52]: Well, yeah. We’ll call it a Brett. That’s a Brett. Brett deserves to have some­thing named after him.

Tony Kynas­ton [49:58]: Yeah. So if I look at the three-point trend line cal­cu­la­tor for today, I know Bret­t’s giv­en some exam­ples from, past times prob­a­bly when you sent the ques­tion in. But today the buy price on CCV Cash Con­vert­ers is 19.7 cents and the share price is 19 cents. So it’s pret­ty close.

Cameron Reil­ly [50:17]:  Right.

Tony Kynas­ton [50:20]: And I think the same thing will apply to RXP. But I can call it up now as well and have a look at it. RXP Ser­vices, if any­one…

Cameron Reil­ly [50:20]: By the way…

Tony Kynas­ton [50:31]: Inter­est­ed in what that is. Yeah.

Cameron Reil­ly [50:33]: I should just clar­i­fy that with CCV, so the end of the month, the end of Octo­ber was closed at 20 cents on the 28th and the 29th of Octo­ber. It looks like by the 30th of Octo­ber though it closed at 19.50 cents. So it actu­al­ly did close the month below the 20 cents, just bare­ly below the 20 cent mark.

Tony Kynas­ton [51:04]: Okay. And what was the ques­tion about RXP? Sor­ry, I got lost in all the noise there. I need Claude Shan­non to work out the sig­nal from the noise for me.

Cameron Reil­ly [51:16]: I think it’s the same thing. You had said RXP isn’t to buy either because…

Tony Kynas­ton [51:23]: Then it’s not.

Cameron Reil­ly [51:23]: I think it dropped back below. So he’s got the tar­get buy as 42 cents, 42.3 cents.

Tony Kynas­ton [51:33]:  Right. Now if I just changed dates in my three-point trend cal­cu­la­tor for today.

Cameron Reil­ly [51:43]: Well it’s 34 and a half cents, so it’s.

Tony Kynas­ton [51:46]: Yes. And I get a buy price of 38.90 cents. So 39. So yeah. You can see with both of those graphs, they sort of hit their lows dur­ing the COVID cough, and then they’ve start­ed to come back up. But in both cas­es, they sort of also then touched the buy line, but they’re start­ing to go back down again. So they a bit of a falling knife I think.

Cameron Reil­ly [52:08]: Yeah. Well, Brett con­tin­ues with Duke­ton.

Tony Kynas­ton [52:13]: As Brett does.

Cameron Reil­ly [52:14]: As Brett does. Same ques­tion though, same email. So it’s not like email num­ber five from Brett this week. With Duke­ton, “Tony said it was a buy, but is now hold because it has gone back below the buy line. I thought I had a light bulb moment when Tony explained his inter­pre­ta­tion of MYE in Episode 349, that some­thing is a buy until it is a sale. But now I’m a bit con­fused because his com­ments on CCV, RXP, and DKM this week seem to con­tra­dict this in my rook­ie head. I don’t want to wear out Tony’s hos­pi­tal­i­ty and I’m not try­ing to find him out. So please only raise this if you think it will be tak­en in good faith as a talk­ing point.” Of course Brett. It’s all good. Yeah. But I think…

Tony Kynas­ton [52:55]:  That’s it. I’m leav­ing. You need to respect me.

Cameron Reil­ly [53:04]: That is actu­al­ly how Tony talks when he’s off-air, by the way. I want peo­ple to know that. This whole nice guy thing is a com­plete fast, you know. But any who…

Tony Kynas­ton [53:17]: No Brett, I under­stand where you’re com­ing from, mate. I think we prob­a­bly have giv­en two answers to that ques­tion over the years.

 [Snip­pet] [53:25]: Don’t hit me with the only neg­a­tive waves. [inaudi­ble 00:53:27] Think that bridge will be there and it will be there. It’s anoth­er beau­ti­ful bridge and it’s going to be there.

Cameron Reil­ly [53:36]: So, but I think when we’ve said it’s a buy until it’s a sale. I mean, I think that’s a con­firmed buy. That’s well, tru­ly solid­ly breached it’s a buy line. Then it’s a buy until it’s a sale. If it peaks its head out, Oh, if it’s like a, you know, it’s like a baby that peeks its head out, looks around and goes, “Eh, I don’t think so” and pulls his head back in.

Tony Kynas­ton [54:01]:  It’s Ground­hog Day.

Cameron Reil­ly [54:04]: It’s a ground­hog. See, that’s bet­ter than call­ing it a Brett. We’ll call it a Ground­hog.

Tony Kynas­ton [54:08]: Yeah.

Cameron Reil­ly [54:09]: Yes. Nice one.


Tony Kynas­ton [54:13]: Packs of 22.

Cameron Reil­ly [54:14]: Well, let’s just go with Ground­hog because I’ll nev­er remem­ber that. Yeah, it’s a Ground­hog. It sticks its head out, pulls it back in. That’s not actu­al­ly a buy. It might be a fake buy for a moment, but it’s not a real buy.

Tony Kynas­ton [54:27]: Man, the first time I saw a real ground­hog, I was on a golf course in Cana­da. They are like the hugest slug you’ve ever seen. Real­ly, real­ly ugly ani­mals.

Cameron Reil­ly [54:37]: Did you hit it on the head with a mal­let?

Tony Kynas­ton [54:40]:  No. I said to my friends, what the fuck is that? It looks like a wom­bat with­out any legs or any eyes or any dis­cernible fea­tures.

Cameron Reil­ly [54:48]: In Cad­dy Shack, was a ground­hog of Bill Mur­ray was run­ning around hit­ting with [inaudi­ble 00:54:54].

Tony Kynas­ton [54:56]: No, gophers.

Cameron Reil­ly [54:56]: Gophers. What’s the dif­fer­ence between a ground­hog and a gopher?

Tony Kynas­ton [54:57]:  Come here, come here lit­tle gopher. Come here.

Cameron Reil­ly [54:57]: Hey, have you seen his new movie yet? The new Sofia Cop­po­la movie?

Tony Kynas­ton [55:05]: I did.

Cameron Reil­ly [55:06]: What did you think?

Tony Kynas­ton [55:07]: Yeah, not bad. Not bad.


Cameron Reil­ly [55:09]: Only, not bad? That’s a…

Tony Kynas­ton [55:10]: Yeah. I mean his char­ac­ter was just amaz­ing. You just want­ed to go out and be like [crosstalk 00:55:17]. That’s always the case I think.

Cameron Reil­ly [55:18]: Yeah.  I thought you enjoyed it. I real­ly enjoyed it. He’s so great. He’s so great. So yeah, so much love for Bill.

Tony Kynas­ton [55:29]:  Yeah, I agree. So styl­ish. Isn’t he?

Cameron Reil­ly [55:32]: Yeah.

Tony Kynas­ton [55:33]: Just talks his way out of park­ing tick­ets. Dri­ves the old car that back­fires. The old Alfa that back­fires around.

Cameron Reil­ly [55:39]: And I absolute­ly believe that’s lift­ed from his real life. I know Sofia said that she based a lot of it on her dad. You know, par­tic­u­lar­ly, we were sit­ting in the cin­e­ma when­ev­er he starts, you know, pulling our sto­ries from his­to­ry to explain some­thing, Chris­sy’s like, “Oh my God that’s so you. He’s just you. You’re just Bill Mur­ray.” And when he’s like, it was sort of a lit­tle bit flir­ta­tious with the young wait­ress and she’s going, “Oh my God. That’s so you. I’m basi­cal­ly mar­ried to Bill Mur­ray, except I’m not that rich.” But when he gets pulled over by the cops and he just talks his way, he’s like, “Okay, is your dad so and so. So yeah, tell him, I said hi. We go way back.” And he talks his way out of it. I was like, “That’s a total Bill Mur­ray movie. Isn’t it just.

Tony Kynas­ton [56:25]: And not just that, but his car won’t start. It won’t go into gear. So the cops gave him a push.

Cameron Reil­ly [56:29]: Yes. Good stuff. Any­way, Ground­hog, where were we? Yes, it’s a Ground­hog.

Tony Kynas­ton [56:28]: So Duke­ton, if I have a look at that one, just to get back to shares, which are a lot less inter­est­ing than say a few Cop­po­la movies. It’s a clear buy. It’s gone way up above it’s a buy line now.

Cameron Reil­ly [56:49]: Are you talk­ing about Duke­ton?

Tony Kynas­ton [56:52]: Duke­ton [inaudi­ble 00:56:53].

Cameron Reil­ly [56:52]:  DKM. Yeah. Let me just look at that and make sure you’re not fudg­ing it.

Tony Kynas­ton [57:02]:  Can I just do a lit­tle qui­et fudge?

Cameron Reil­ly [56:06]: I’m glad the cam­er­a’s not on. I don’t want to see it if you do. Yes. You know, it’s buy was about, I don’t know, about 20, 27 cents and it’s now at 28.50.

Tony Kynas­ton [57:18]: Yeah. Some­thing like that.

Cameron Reil­ly [57:20]: Okay. So good one, Brett. Tim asked a ques­tion dur­ing the week that I knew you’ve answered many times, but I could not remem­ber. And I could­n’t find it in my notes. What per­cent­age of the aver­age dai­ly trade is your bench­mark?

Tony Kynas­ton [57:37]: Is it in the Bible? I think I said 20%, maybe 25.

Cameron Reil­ly [57:40]: I could­n’t remem­ber if it was 20 or 50.

Tony Kynas­ton [57:43]: I think we’re okay. So I would say 20 but I have bought up to 50 if I real­ly like it. But yeah, 20 is a good num­ber, I think.

Cameron Reil­ly [57:55]: Right. I don’t think it is in the Bible, but I am going to put it in the Bible.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:01]: Yeah.

Cameron Reil­ly [58:02]: Because that’s a good thing to remem­ber.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:04]: Yeah. We don’t want to be the only buy­er in the stock. It’ll dri­ve the price up and when it comes time to sell, we don’t want to be a part of a large crowd try­ing to get out the fire door as well.

Cameron Reil­ly [58:13]: Yeah. Well, thank you, Tim. And the last ques­tion is from Chris and this is about Sand­fire resources, which you talked about ear­li­er. He was want­i­ng to know if you thought it was a Schro­ding­er.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:24]: I think it could be. I think I said that in the Stock Jour­nal I sent through today.

Cameron Reil­ly [58:29]: Maybe you did.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:30]: You may have not have read it yet any­way.

Cameron Reil­ly [58:32]:  I’ve read it. Post­ed it. I can’t remem­ber it.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:34]: Any­way I’ll call it up.

Cameron Reil­ly [58:36]: So yes, I’ve got it up. The buy is cer­tain­ly above it’s a buy and I’d say it’s on the sell line pret­ty much.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:48]: Yeah. That’s right. In fact, I think I called this one my bun­ny baller. It looks like it’s an upward buy rather than the falling knife. Although it could be a falling knife.

Cameron Reil­ly [58:57]:  Right.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:58]: Yeah. No, I think it’s it. It cer­tain­ly has the poten­tial to be a falling knife. So I’d be watch­ing this one. I don’t own Sand­fire and I’m not rec­om­mend­ing Sand­fire. But if you were to buy it, I’d be watch­ing it to make sure it does­n’t become a sell again.

Cameron Reil­ly [59:10]: It’s a bun­ny boil­er Schro­ding­er. Oh, wow.

Tony Kynas­ton [59:16]: See, it’s fun­ny. Because like the mar­ket, last week was all full of bad news about Sand­fire on Fri­day because there were these rumors that Chi­na was­n’t going to buy any cop­per from Aus­tralia and Sand­fire is a cop­per-gold pro­duc­er. And the share price has gone up 2% today. So go fig­ure.

Cameron Reil­ly [59:36]:  Yeah. Maybe some­body knows some­thing.

Tony Kynas­ton [59:41]: Cor­rect.

Cameron Reil­ly [59:43]: All right. Well, that’s all the ques­tions. That’s all the show, I think for this week, Tony.

Tony Kynas­ton [59:49]: Yeah, I think just one last thing, we haven’t done a top three shares.

Cameron Reil­ly [59:54]: Oh yeah.

Tony Kynas­ton [59:56]: And I was­n’t going to but I’ve got one again because of the Stock Jour­nal I did today. I did a com­plete down­load and went through it. I did that part­ly because there were com­pa­nies that have report­ed it in the last week. So the banks have report­ed. Mac­quar­ie Group report­ed but their num­bers haven’t appeared in Stock Doc­tor as of this morn­ing when I ran my down­load, but they’ll appear soon. Eclipse is going to be report­ing soon. So we need to do a down­load and get some new num­bers on that. I went through and checked all the com­pa­nies that have report­ed in the last cou­ple of months. And one of those was Kath­man­du KMD. So I’ve added Kath­man­du to the buy­er list. So that might be the one that I would rec­om­mend peo­ple have a look at. It’s QAV score from mem­o­ry was at the bot­tom end of the range. I think it was either 0.13 or 0.15, some­thing around that.

Cer­tain­ly, I don’t own shares in the com­pa­ny. It’s cer­tain­ly a com­pa­ny I’ve owned shares in the past. It’s under new man­age­ment. So it’s a bit of a turn­around sto­ry. I mean, Kath­man­du, peo­ple will be aware is a fleecy, pullover, ski, park­er type retail­er based in New Zealand sewing warm clothes and bean­ies and gloves and oth­er things like that, and has done quite well over the years. But it did get stuck in a rut where it was hav­ing most of its sales dur­ing its dis­count­ed peri­od. So basi­cal­ly every six months it would refresh its stock and clear its old stock. And it was at that time, that clear­ance time that they did the most sales and kind of, some­times retail­ers can get stuck on a cycle of their cus­tomers know­ing when the clear­ance sale is com­ing and there­fore they hold off pur­chas­ing until I can buy the item they like cheap­ly, which is under­stand­able.

But new man­age­ment has kind of weaned cus­tomers off that cycle a bit and it’s on the improved stock of the week. Kath­man­du have a look at that. And just to round out that dis­cus­sion, I also got new num­bers for CIA, which has Cham­pi­on Iron, which is a share I own. And the num­bers went up slight­ly. I think the QAV score went from about 0.18 to 0.2, but no big increase there even though new num­bers came in. So that was anoth­er one to check out, I guess if you’re inter­est­ed and we do have fresh num­bers for it. And I expect to get some fresh num­bers out for Eclipse and Mac­quar­ie Group in the next week as well.

Cameron Reil­ly [01:02:21]: I thought Kath­man­du closed down or some­thing. Or it was just a pan­dem­ic clo­sure ear­li­er this year.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:02:29]: Oh yeah. It may have actu­al­ly closed its retail stores in New Zealand. But it does do a fair bit of work, a fair bit of sales online, so it was­n’t com­plete­ly [inaudi­ble 01:02:39].

Cameron Reil­ly [01:02:40]: Right. Okay. Good stuff, Tony. What do you get else? What do you get on for the rest of the week? Any big plans?

Tony Kynas­ton [01:02:50]: No, I’ve got a game of golf. I was away for a while, so I’ve got to catch up on some just admin pay­ing bills and things like that, which are always pret­ty bor­ing, but needs to get done. Pay the tax­man. Pay the horse breed­ers. Buy some hay. All that kind of stuff. My sis­ter goes into the hos­pi­tal tomor­row, so that’s not very nice. I’ll be spend­ing some time with her. And that’s about it, I think. How about you?

Cameron Reil­ly [01:03:21]: We’ve got a school excur­sion to Wet’n’Wild on Fri­day. So that should be, can you imag­ine Fox at Wet’n’Wild? Oh my God.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:03:33]:  Oh, I can imag­ine the water­park. So yeah.

Cameron Reil­ly [01:03:36]: With all of his friends from school and it’s going to be crazy. Chris­sy and I are going along as part of the parental con­tin­gent.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:03:43]: You dri­ve down there in the Alpha Romeo.

Cameron Reil­ly [01:03:47]: Yes.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:03:48]: What Bill Mur­ray did?

Cameron Reil­ly [01:03:49]: Yes, yes. It took me a minute to tweak there. Yeah. Is that what he was dri­ving? I did­n’t pay any atten­tion. It was a nice lit­tle old con­vert­ible. But I did want to men­tion that we’ve got some more good inter­views com­ing up. We just did an inter­view this after­noon with Richard Ivers from Prime Val­ue Asset Man­age­ment. He’s a Port­fo­lio Man­ag­er of the Small Cap Port­fo­lio. We had a great chat with him and I think we’ve got Damien com­ing on the show next week. Damien Park­er, a QAV sub­scriber with great busi­ness expe­ri­ence based in the Gold Coast, he’s going to be com­ing on. I think Phil has set us up with an inter­view with Andrew Page from Straw­man. It’s hap­pen­ing soon. We’ve got a ton of inter­views com­ing down the pipeline from a wide vari­ety of peo­ple, which is, they’re always fun.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:04:40]: Yeah. We have the CEO from Share­sight too booked haven’t we as well?

Cameron Reil­ly [01:04:43]: Yes. Share­sight CEO com­ing on. Oh, we’ve got, Stephen Bruce who is one of the Port­fo­lio Man­agers at Peren­ni­al Fund as well, com­ing on in the next cou­ple of weeks. Just yeah, a ton of inter­est­ing peo­ple.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:04:57]: Hey, and when the bor­ders open up that we can do some more din­ners as well.

Cameron Reil­ly [01:05:03]: Do some din­ners. We should do anoth­er Zoom call, I guess, com­ing up soon too. But yeah, I’m look­ing for­ward to doing some more din­ners. They’re always a lot of fun and we can go down and have that catch up with Alan Kohler that we were going to do before the Mel­bourne shut­down last time. I want to talk to him about his book selec­tions that he keeps show­ing on TV. Always, always inter­est­ing. The books that he throws up there as an indi­ca­tion of what he’s real­ly think­ing about. And they’re always like unlike­ly, they’ve been about soci­etal col­lapse. And you’re like, “Oh geez.” Okay. Alan’s pes­simistic, I think.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:05:44]: Yeah. Well, he is often­times. Yeah. Yeah. That’d be great, Cam. I’m look­ing for­ward to that. And if he’s lis­ten­ing, look­ing for­ward to shar­ing him a lunch. He was good to us in the ear­ly days.

Cameron Reil­ly [01:05:55]: Yes.

Tony Kynas­ton [01:05:56]: Yeah. And if any­one’s got any ques­tions for any of our inter­view top­ics or any inter­view peo­ple that are com­ing up, please send them through. Any more feed­back or ques­tions are always great­ly appre­ci­at­ed. Any­thing that we should be talk­ing about that we’re not talk­ing about, please let us know.

Cameron Reil­ly [01:06:13]: Well, there you go. That’s it. Tony’s done the wrap-up. Have a good week every­one. Ciao. 

Tony Kynas­ton [01:06:19]:  Yeah. Thanks, Cam.

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