QAV 408 Transcript

Episode: QAV 408 Club

Length: 1:13:44

 

Cameron Reil­ly [0:05]: Wel­come back to QAV. TK, how was your tiny sec­ond hol­i­day in as many weeks?

Tony Kynas­ton [0:12]: The min­nie break was good. We went up to Shoal Bay for a few nights, which is on the water north of New­cas­tle.

Cameron Reil­ly [0:19]: New­cas­tle when­ev­er I had to say that.

Tony Kynas­ton [0:24]: Seems like it’s a test of your work­ing-class cre­den­tials, but every­one up they call it New­cas­tle. So, I don’t know which is right.

Cameron Reil­ly [0:32]: New­cas­tle.

Tony Kynas­ton [0:37]: But It was nice. Yes, good. And we had a friend who had a 60th over the week­end. So, it’s been a big sort of five or six days.

Cameron Reil­ly [0:44]: Is that why you were away? Was that for that or it was a sep­a­rate thing?

Tony Kynas­ton [0:47]: No, just coin­ci­den­tal we arrange it to fol­low up.

Cameron Reil­ly [0:51]: What did you do in, was it Shell Bay?

Tony Kynas­ton [0:55]: Shoal Bay.

Cameron Reil­ly [0:56]: Shoal Bay. What did you in Shoal Bay?

Tony Kynas­ton [0:58]: Not a lot to do there. It’s just a nice lit­tle place. We had a nice din­ner in an old-style pub. We had sort of a plan­ta­tion-style, which was nice, and went for a long walk. And then we spent a day up in the winer­ies in the Hunter Val­ley doing some wine tast­ing, which was nice.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:17]: Love­ly. I was just look­ing at some, a web­site for Shoal Bay looks very pret­ty. I’ve nev­er heard of it before. I’ll have to check it out.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:24]: Yes, there’s a port Steven Nel­son Bay in Shoal Bay, they’re all on the same sort of area, dif­fer­ent sort of buy­ers com­ing in off the ocean. Pret­ty. Remind­ed me a bit of a muse­um it’s got a very nar­row, rocky inlet with almost a moun­tain on the side of it.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:45]: Add this to my list of things for my new trav­el pod­cast places to go, Shoal Bay. Well, a cou­ple of peo­ple on the Face­book group was sort of sur­prised. I think Phil Mus­catel­lo was say­ing, Tony told me that report­ing sea­son is his busiest time of the year is going away and anoth­er hol­i­day and I’m, well, for Tony, the busiest time of the year, see, he’s com­ing from a low base. He can take four days off in a week, work half of the last day, still the most work he’s done. Liv­ing the dream, as some­body said. Good for you. That’s good.

Tony Kynas­ton [2:34]: Thank you.

Cameron Reil­ly [2:36]: All right. Well, we’ve got a lot on this week. So, let’s get into it. We sold [cross-talk­ing 2:45].Well, we sold us we tru­ly sold some­thing [inaudi­ble 2:48] that hap­pens.

Tony Kynas­ton [2:51]: Yes. [cross-talk­ing 2:52] right thing on that one. But any­way.

Cameron Reil­ly [2:55]: Real­ly?

Tony Kynas­ton [2:55]: Well, it was going down and down. And we knew that this is por­tal resources. And we knew that Chris Cor­ri­g­an, I think he was a 30% share­hold­er had sold out, which was send­ing the share price tum­bling. But as soon as we sold it, it went up 10%. It was a 50/50 call. And we could have held on because it has­n’t crossed the three-point trend­line yet for a sell was using the rule that if there’s a major share­hold­er sell­ing that could be assigned to sell. And I think it dropped from about 10 cents down to sev­en cents a share when that hap­pened. And I think our sell prices maybe sort of four or five, six, maybe five, so I did look to me, like it was going to break it and why to hang around for that last two cents to drop, but it sta­bi­lized after that.

Cameron Reil­ly [3:53]: Any­way. Well, we replaced it with VUK. It’s done okay. It’s all been made up for by good old Cop­per Moun­tain. I’m not even going to try and say the code because I always get it wrong. Cop­per moun­tains up 190%. Since we bought in Octo­ber, it’s done as well as FMG has in two years in like three months.

Tony Kynas­ton [4:26]: It’s incred­i­ble. And it was a good arti­cle on the fin review. I think I sent it through to you about cop­per, and how it’s going up?

Cameron Reil­ly [4:35]: Well, you called it for those peo­ple that are rel­a­tive­ly new. A cou­ple of months ago, I think it was back in Octo­ber, Tony was look­ing at index Mun­di, which charts a lot of things but com­mod­i­ty prices amongst them. And notice that cop­per was tick­ing upon the com­mod­i­ty price and had a look at our buy list and we had a cop­per stock that was on the buy list C6C there I got it right and say, let’s buy some of that and it’s gone gang­busters. You also said Allah min­i­mum was going up. So, we bought Capral, CAA and has­n’t done as well. It’s not bad. It’s up 23% since then, so it’s alright, but it’s not up 190% That’s crazy.

Tony Kynas­ton [5:16]: No, I also bought some sand fire resources for myself which is on the buy list. And that jumped about 10% dur­ing the week because of cop­per. So, it’s up a lit­tle bit but not C6C.

Cameron Reil­ly [5:28]: Yes, right. Good call. Well, speak­ing on I won’t get into that I might jump ahead that much. GME, the whole rat­ed GME Kei­th Gill, aka deep eff­ing val­ue, aka roar­ing kit­ty. I think is his YouTube name, he’s a mil­lion­aire. He’s the guy that start­ed the whole thing. He’s a mil­lion­aire who tes­ti­fied in front of Con­gress, as the price was going up, he sold a bunch of options on the way up that he had and end­ed up get­ting 13 mil­lion in cash, took some of the cash, and bought more stock with it has­n’t sold a sin­gle share, but sold a ton of options on the way up. He’s tes­ti­fied in front of Con­gress about the whole thing, but he’s also being sued. What did­n’t reveal to peo­ple dur­ing this whole process that he’s a reg­is­tered stock­bro­ker which he should have done real­ly for full trans­paren­cy. But any­way, so that’s the lat­est there, he’s being sued. But he did make mil­lions out of the whole thing, as you pre­dict­ed.

Tony Kynas­ton [6:56]: Yes. And hope­ful­ly, he was telling peo­ple, he had options on the way up as well. And he was a stock­hold­er. Oth­er­wise, it is just pump­ing and dump­ing isn’t just using YouTube and read it instead of the tele­phone from 10 20 years ago.

Cameron Reil­ly [7:12]: Yes, maybe. I don’t know. What’s the dif­fer­ence between pump­ing and dump­ing and just say­ing I like this; I’m going to buy it?

Tony Kynas­ton [7:21]: Well, my under­stand­ing is he did­n’t say that he pulled it both options, is actu­al­ly a wall street bro­ker, or if he’s not Wall Street as a bro­ker, and then start­ed pump­ing it, and then start­ed to sell out of the options as the share price rose. None of that was dis­closed. That’s a pump and dump.

Cameron Reil­ly [7:39]: But he also bought more shares on the way up.

Tony Kynas­ton [7:43]: Yes, okay. [Inaudi­ble 7:44] I sup­pose. So, maybe it’s a fudge pump and dumps?

Cameron Reil­ly [7:48]: I guess they prob­a­bly have to look at the tim­ing of events. What did he own? When did he own it? When did he buy it? When did he tell peo­ple to buy it? And if you’re just an aver­age punter, and you say, I like this stock, and then peo­ple jump on and you do well over it. Is that dif­fer­ent to you being an aver­age punter, who also hap­pens to be a stock­bro­ker? Who tells peo­ple to do that? I’m not sure what the legal­i­ties are in the Unit­ed States around that kind of stuff. But I imag­ine it would be frowned upon.

Tony Kynas­ton [8:22]: Yes, well, its mar­ket manip­u­la­tion, isn’t it? But I bought some­thing and I pumped it as big an audi­ence as I can. And I’ve sold some­thing, some of it any­way. To my ben­e­fit.

Cameron Reil­ly [8:34]: But the flip side of that argu­ment is we’ve talked about what about the hedge funds who, buy a bunch of puts and then go around pump­ing up why it’s such a sucky busi­ness? Brought the price down and you prof­it from it. They do that all the time, appar­ent­ly, and get away with it.

Tony Kynas­ton [8:51]: They do. That’s right.

Cameron Reil­ly [8:52]: Let’s call it sell­ing your book or some­thing like that.

Tony Kynas­ton [8:55]: Or talk­ing your book.

Cameron Reil­ly [8:57]: Talk­ing your book?

Tony Kynas­ton [9:00]: No, I think that does hap­pen. And that’s pret­ty much stan­dard prac­tice for any invest­ment bank, they’ll put big stars on the stocks that they either own or they’re doing work for Sega was be aware of that. But I under­stand what you’re say­ing. I think it’s a dif­fi­cult one. I think it’s mar­ket manip­u­la­tion. He held the posi­tion and went out through YouTube to pray that to a large audi­ence and pumped it and then sold on the way up to the game. He did buy some more back so it’s not all bad, but to me, that’s mar­ket manip­u­la­tion.

Cameron Reil­ly [9:36]: Well, again, I feel sor­ry for the poor pun­ters that are still hold­ing on.

Tony Kynas­ton [9:43]: I don’t feel sor­ry for them, they are all greedy and did­n’t know what they were doing.

Cameron Reil­ly [9:49]: Yes, but they were dumb. Don’t you feel sor­ry for dumb peo­ple?

Tony Kynas­ton [9:56]: Because they dumb, dumb things hap­pen to them. They com­plete­ly duped. Yes, I feel sor­ry for them.  But if the shoe was on the oth­er foot, and they were now cry­ing about the mil­lion dol­lars they all made out of GME. I would­n’t be going around pat­ting him on the back on it. So, don’t feel too sor­ry for them.

Cameron Reil­ly [10:22]: Wow. You’re a hard man, Tony. What’s your deal? Why are you so cold and bit­ter?

Tony Kynas­ton [10:33]: I’m not cold and bit­ter. Hope­ful­ly, these peo­ple did­n’t put all their life sav­ings into it. I don’t think they did.

Cameron Reil­ly [10:44]: No. Well, I don’t know. Peo­ple who know what peo­ple did but reminds me of some­thing I put in our newslet­ter. Last week. Well, this week, yes, this is from James Mon­tier’s book, The Lit­tle Book of Behav­ioral Invest­ing he a lit­tle table in it. A good process the deliv­ers a good out­come is deserved suc­cess. A good process that deliv­ers a bad out­come is a bad break. A bad process that deliv­ers a good out­come as dumb luck, and a bad process that deliv­ers a bad out­come as poet­ic jus­tice. I was think­ing about putting that on a cof­fee mug. And he goes on to say in the book, peo­ple often judge a past deci­sion by its out­come rather than bas­ing it on the qual­i­ty of the deci­sion at the time it was made.

Giv­en what was known at the time. This is out­come bias. Psy­cho­log­i­cal evi­dence also shows that focus­ing on out­comes can cre­ate all sorts of unwant­ed actions. For instance, in a world in which short-term per­for­mance is every­thing, fund man­agers may end up buy­ing stocks they find easy to jus­ti­fy to their clients, rather than those that rep­re­sent the best oppor­tu­ni­ty. In gen­er­al, hold­ing peo­ple account­able for out­comes tends to increase the fol­low­ing focus on out­comes with the high­est cer­tain­ty which is known as ambi­gu­i­ty aver­sion, col­lec­tion and use of all infor­ma­tion both use­ful and use­less.

Pref­er­ence for com­pro­mise options, selec­tion of prod­ucts with aver­age fea­tures on all mea­sures over a prod­uct with mixed fea­tures, i.e., aver­age on four trades pre­ferred to good on two and bad on two degrees of loss aver­sion that peo­ple dis­play. None of these fea­tures is like­ly to serve investors well, togeth­er, they sug­gest that when every deci­sion is mea­sured on out­comes, investors are like­ly to avoid uncer­tain­ty chase noise, and herd with the con­sen­sus. Sounds like a pret­ty good descrip­tion of much of the invest­ment indus­try to me, he writes.

Tony Kynas­ton [12:52]: Yes, that’s right. So, it’s all group­think and index hug­ging to use that risk aver­sion.

Cameron Reil­ly [12:58]: Index hug­ging I like that. It’s a good process. You fol­low a good process sure. It’s not going to work all of the time, but you’re fol­low­ing a good process. And you hope that because it’s a good process, it’ll work more times than it fails.

Tony Kynas­ton [13:18]: Well, and I think that’s right. And I think the point of the arti­cle is that I’m not going to mea­sure myself on quar­ter­ly earn­ings, or even six-month­ly earn­ings, or even poten­tial­ly year­ly earn­ings. It’s got to be over the long term. But if you’re a fund man­ag­er, and you are being mon­i­tored month­ly, on your per­for­mance, you do tend to try and mit­i­gate risk, and that mit­i­ga­tion of risk takes you away from your process. And they can’t sur­vive, say two or three bad quar­ters, well look at all of the val­ue funds, which are out there which have lost man­dates and lost mon­ey that was invest­ed in them. That’s why peo­ple keep say­ing val­ue invest­ing is dead. Because it’s the funds out there that hold them­selves up as val­ue investors, which peo­ple tak­ing mon­ey out of for growth funds instead. Because the peo­ple are doing what that arti­cle says they should­n’t be doing, which is look­ing at short-term results.

Cameron Reil­ly [14:20]: Speak­ing of account­abil­i­ty and out­comes, you sent me this arti­cle about dis­clo­sure changes.

Tony Kynas­ton [14:28]: Yes, so it was a bit annoy­ing when I saw that it’s just a sum­ma­ry over COVID-19. The gov­ern­ment loos­ened up dis­clo­sures but tight­ened up the law around a direc­tor board being able to be sued or com­pa­nies being able to be sued by share­hold­ers, who had suf­fered adverse­ly because the com­pa­ny had­n’t either dis­closed every­thing or had been selec­tive in its dis­clo­sures and as a gen­er­al rule of the law, say as soon as the com­pa­ny comes into infor­ma­tion that might affect the share price, they need to dis­close that to the pub­lic. And that law was watered down a lit­tle bit dur­ing COVID. Because the gov­ern­ment lis­tened to the com­pa­ny direc­tors who said, this is such an uncer­tain time, we don’t want to be liable if we know some­thing hap­pens out of the left field, and we don’t fol­low the dis­clo­sure rules appro­pri­ate­ly. And we want to be the slack.

And so, they are giv­en that slack. But the gov­ern­ment then came out last week and said, we’re going to keep this as a per­ma­nent water­ing down of dis­clo­sure laws. Now, the prob­lem that’s hap­pen­ing out there with list­ed com­pa­nies is that because over the last, say, five years or so, there’s been a lot of class actions against direc­tors of com­pa­nies around con­tin­u­ous dis­clo­sure. And if I think about some of them, Coles, sor­ry, Myer had a class action that they had the sev­er­al because this pre­vi­ous CEO came out and said one thing, and then a few months lat­er, the share price went down dra­mat­i­cal­ly. And the prospects for the com­pa­ny were very dif­fer­ent from the guid­ance he was giv­ing a month ear­li­er. And so, there was a class action about that. Com­pa­nies like AMP, have faced class actions over whether they’ve been dis­clos­ing every­thing that’s going on inside the com­pa­ny. Because the share price is going down, and share­hold­ers have lost mon­ey because of that

The flow-on effect from that is that direc­tors are find­ing it hard to get direc­tors lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance, the pre­mi­ums are going through the roof. And gen­er­al­ly, that insur­ance is tak­en out by the com­pa­ny for the direc­tor. But it’s becom­ing a pro­hib­i­tive cost. And so, the gov­ern­ment was try­ing to solve that prob­lem. And did it by mak­ing the dis­clo­sure laws a lit­tle bit loos­er, there­fore mak­ing it hard­er for class actions to hap­pen. I think that was a pret­ty weak sort of solu­tion to the prob­lem, I would have rather have seen some­thing to address direc­tors’ lia­bil­i­ty pre­mi­ums, and or class actions, rather than con­tin­u­ous dis­clo­sure, because con­tin­u­ous dis­clo­sure needs to hap­pen in a share mar­ket. Oth­er­wise, we either don’t get the infor­ma­tion or some­one gets it before we do, which are both bad things for investors. And just on that, I think the direc­tors are being sued, because they haven’t always act­ed in the way they should. And just to say that’s a prob­lem, and there­fore mak­ing it hard­er to be sued isn’t address­ing the prob­lem. The prob­lem is the direc­tors need to improve their game a lit­tle bit, too. So, as we all know, it’s the big end of town.

I guess it does­n’t mat­ter who’s in gov­ern­ment, but they’re big donors to the par­ties. And when they say they’d like to change, it gen­er­al­ly hap­pens. So, I think this is the sort of wrong change, but it just tried to solve the right prob­lem. And the broad­er issue is that the con­cept of lim­it­ed lia­bil­i­ty for com­pa­nies is an impor­tant one if you’re a direc­tor of lim­it­ed lia­bil­i­ty, pub­licly-trad­ed com­pa­ny, and some­thing hap­pens that goes wrong in that com­pa­ny, your assets should­n’t be able to be tak­en away from you because of that. And that’s where things are head­ing with class-action law­suits that are hap­pen­ing, I think there’s only been one, maybe two cas­es, I can think of that where a direc­tor lost per­son­al assets because of their activ­i­ty on the board. So, it’s got to be a pret­ty seri­ous thing for that to hap­pen. And it’s gen­er­al­ly cov­ered by the lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance they take out. But as the lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance becomes sky­rock­ets it becomes pro­hib­i­tive to take it out. And com­pa­nies and boards try and trim down what’s cov­ered to reduce their pre­mi­ums. And so that con­cept of being shield­ed from per­son­al lia­bil­i­ty gets less­ened as well. So, it’s a real prob­lem that needs to be stopped. I just think this is the wrong way to do it.

Cameron Reil­ly [19:13]: When you say the cost of lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance is pro­hib­i­tive, how pro­hib­i­tive, we’re talk­ing about the direc­tor class that is mak­ing a ton of mon­ey from being senior exec­u­tives and board mem­bers of these com­pa­nies. The com­pa­nies are mak­ing mon­ey hand over fist how pro­hib­i­tive isn’t real­ly?

Tony Kynas­ton [19:32]: Prob­a­bly not for the big com­pa­nies. A cou­ple of things have hap­pened. I know that the num­ber of insur­ers who are offer­ing direc­tors lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance has shrunk. So, for exam­ple, some of the big insur­ers out of Lon­don won’t even touch Aus­tralia any­more. For director’s lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance. And I think the risk that is wor­ry­ing direc­tors is that they’re pay­ing some­times up to 10 times more for direc­tors’ lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance now than they were. But there’s a small­er pool, and the pool is whit­tling away the ben­e­fits of direc­tors’ lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance, which I think is that you need to have director’s lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance you if I went on the board of, XYZ Cor­po­ra­tion, I’d only do so if I knew that if some­thing went wrong at XYZ Cor­po­ra­tion, they would­n’t come and take my house away from me. If that does­n’t work, then you stop hav­ing direc­tors. Who would want to risk it going on a board? And then you have, either no direc­tors or very poor-qual­i­ty direc­tors, and we don’t want that either.

Cameron Reil­ly [20:39]: So, there needs to be a bal­ance here some­where.

Tony Kynas­ton [20:41]: Cor­rect. And that loos­en­ing dis­clo­sure laws, I don’t think is the right way to solve this prob­lem. The gov­ern­ment could­n’t, for exam­ple, have set up their pool of direc­tors’ lia­bil­i­ty insur­ance. And the same way that says, work­ers comp works in New Zealand. So, all the com­pa­nies pay into a fund, it’s mon­i­tored by the gov­ern­ment. And it cov­ers the lia­bil­i­ties when­ev­er there’s a prob­lem. That’s one way of doing it. Then there are poten­tial­ly oth­er ways of doing it as well, I could have just changed the law on allow­ing class actions rather than chang­ing the law on the process of ongo­ing dis­clo­sure.

Cameron Reil­ly [21:22]: The gov­ern­men­t’s got tense for run­ning an extor­tion rack­et for Rupert Mur­doch and Ker­ry Stokes against Google and Face­book.

Tony Kynas­ton [21:32]: Did you just call me Ray?

Cameron Reil­ly [21:35]: No. Did I?

Tony Kynas­ton [21:39]: Yes.

Cameron Reil­ly [21:40]: Again?

Tony Kynas­ton [21:41]: Yes.

Cameron Reil­ly [21:42]: Holy shit. I did a show with Ray this morn­ing where we were talk­ing about this. [Cross-talk­ing 21:48].

Tony Kynas­ton [21:50]: You can’t talk in your sleep.

Cameron Reil­ly [21:53]: Any­way, let’s move on.

Tony Kynas­ton [21:56]: We did that. Google and Face­book and those com­pa­nies pay no frig­ging tax in Aus­tralia. Why we are tack­ling that prob­lem first is beyond me? Rather than prop­ping up Rupert Mur­doch, it’s unbe­liev­able.

Cameron Reil­ly [22:11]: Yes, it’s a whole. We could go on about both of those things. But let’s not get side­tracked, Tony. Now good enough stuff per­ti­nent to what we’re talk­ing about jour­nal entries. You put out a bunch of jour­nal entries this week, in the last week.

Tony Kynas­ton [22:29]: Yes, last com­pa­nies com­pa­ny report­ing sea­son.

Cameron Reil­ly [22:31]: There are many high­lights that you want to talk about the stock of the week or any­thing?

Tony Kynas­ton [22:37]: Yes, stock of the week, I think is worth talk­ing about. And I’m going to make ANZ bank the stock of the week. And last time I looked they have a QAV score of point four, so it’s quite high up the list of a large com­pa­ny, ANZ bank, every­one would know about it unless I guess they’re over­seas but a large Aus­tralian bank, one of the big four. So, the 20 odd per­cent mar­ket share. I recall going back when the bank start­ed report­ing in around August, last year, the cue QAV scores were real­ly good, but the sen­ti­ment was still down. So now that they’ve had a very sol­id uptrend, and we’re get­ting above the three-point bar lines the uptrend is as a break­out, if you like, it’s pret­ty clear the bank­ing sec­tor is now doing well. The key for me is they’re writ­ing back the bad debt pro­vi­sions they took out dur­ing COVID. And maybe a lit­tle bit before that, but par­tic­u­lar­ly dur­ing COVID.

So COVID has­n’t been the big dis­as­ter that every­one thought it would be for the banks, and then they are recov­er­ing. And those pro­vi­sions in the share prices are recov­er­ing. So, I find this hap­pens from time to time in my invest­ing process. I don’t set out to buy bank stocks. But sud­den­ly we have lots of bank stocks on our buy list. And that tends to hap­pen from time to time. So, it’s been iron ore, it’s been its often com­mod­i­ty base, as we talked about before, it’s cop­per at the moment, with gold three or four years ago, at one stage it was air­line com­pa­nies. So, indus­tries are cycli­cal, and they have the day in the sun. And I think bank­ing is just start­ing to have this. So, the big solar com­pa­nies, I think peo­ple have been gun shy of them for a lit­tle while. And just to put some back­ground around that, around the time of the GFC in par­tic­u­lar, and maybe a lit­tle bit after that. When bank inter­est rates were, pret­ty pal­try, and they look great now but back then now maybe two or 3% if you put your mon­ey on deposit. Now you bug­ger all, you’ll be get­ting one if you’re lucky. But peo­ple were buy­ing bank shares for the div­i­dends and the bank’s got­ten to this kind of trap of pan­der­ing to their large retail share­hold­er.

The bias­es and pay­ing out 80 or 90% of their prof­its in div­i­dends, which gave them good yields of sort of six or 7%. And so, the super­an­nu­a­tion army sup­port­ed them for a long time. But you can’t run a busi­ness on 10% of the prof­it. And even­tu­al­ly, under-invest­ment in tech­nol­o­gy, in par­tic­u­lar, start­ed to play out as a theme for them, and the bank share start­ed going down. And that became a vicious cycle as the retirees start­ed sell­ing out. And then COVID came along, and that knocked them down in anoth­er run. But now things are look­ing out for them. And this is prob­a­bly the change to reset their div­i­dend pay­out ratios back to a more nor­mal lev­el, they’ll always be high pay­outs because they did not monop­o­lis­tic busi­ness­es, they don’t need a whole heap to grow because they just chug along. prof­its to be rein­vest­ed to grow, but they need some. So, I think that the bank­ing indus­try is look­ing good. And who knows what will hap­pen? I don’t want to fore­cast but gen­er­al­ly when I say indus­tries in this kind of nascent posi­tion are try­ing to turn up. It usu­al­ly ends up pret­ty good.

Cameron Reil­ly [26:12]: Alright. Well, I don’t need to do a chart on it because it looks pret­ty obvi­ous what the chart looks like. Last week, your stock of the week was Bo Q, I think and we’ve got a cou­ple of ques­tions about that this week in their acquisition’s slash­es merg­er with ME Bank. We’ll get into that a lit­tle bit lat­er on. All right. [inaudi­ble 26:34]any­thing else you want to talk about from the stock jour­nal, any­thing else, grabs your atten­tion this week?

Tony Kynas­ton [26:41]: No, I had piz­za. It’s a fast and furi­ous week, I was just doing anoth­er down­load. Before that became on the show. And I had to stop because there were so many new results in so I’ll prob­a­bly put out a jour­nal tonight or tomor­row about it. But peo­ple should be doing their down­loads quite dili­gent­ly this week and next week, maybe the week after. Because it will change quick­ly.

Cameron Reil­ly [27:03]: All right. Well, let’s get into the ques­tions then. Andrew said hi, Cam and Tony in his book valu­able. Roger Mont­gomery repeat­ed­ly sug­gests the return on equi­ty as a met­ric for assess­ing the qual­i­ty of a com­pa­ny. And as a pos­si­ble indi­ca­tor of future changes in the share price. The con­cept makes sense to me. But I did­n’t feel Roger pro­vid­ed any­thing oth­er than anec­do­tal evi­dence to sup­port his argu­ment. As a result, I’ve done my analy­sis. And I thought per­haps you guys and maybe oth­er lis­ten­ers might be inter­est­ed in what I found. I’ve looked at the top 150 com­pa­nies on the ASX and pulled data from stock Dr. Going back half-year­ly to June 2010 were avail­able.

I looked at return on equi­ty net debt to equi­ty and rev­enue growth one year with a cor­re­spond­ing share price a cou­ple of months lat­er, I then put the data into a sta­tis­ti­cal soft­ware pack­age and looked for cor­re­la­tion, and ran a mul­ti­ple regres­sion analy­sis. To sum­ma­rize the find­ings, there is no sig­nif­i­cant cor­re­la­tion between net debt to equi­ty and share price. There is a weak cor­re­la­tion between rev­enue growth, but it does not have a sig­nif­i­cant influ­ence on sub­se­quent share prices. How­ev­er, there is a sig­nif­i­cant cor­re­la­tion between ROE and share price. Across all the top 150 com­pa­nies with oth­er fac­tors remain­ing equal a 1% increase in ROE was asso­ci­at­ed with a 42-cent increase in share price over the next five months.

For the sub­set of com­pa­nies with a share price above $20, The effect was more pro­nounced in this group, a 1% increase in ROI was asso­ci­at­ed with a $1.40 increase in share price over the same time­frame. Sta­tis­ti­cal­ly speak­ing, I think the results are sig­nif­i­cant enough that I’ve amend­ed my spread­sheet accord­ing­ly. I know we already look at increas­ing equi­ty. How­ev­er, there are exam­ples exam­ple BHP, where are we are increas­ing along with share price, while the equi­ty of the busi­ness has decreased. I think in these cas­es ROE might be a bet­ter met­ric to use. So, for the time being, all of us both and see how it goes any­way, I thought you and the oth­er lis­ten­ers might find this inter­est­ing and hope­ful­ly even use­ful. Kind regards, Andrew. What do you think of all that, Tony?

Tony Kynas­ton [29:24]: Well, lots to talk about there isn’t there? Let me start with a gen­er­al overview of my thoughts on return on equi­ty. And basi­cal­ly, every­one who teach­es about share mar­ket invest­ment starts with return on equi­ty. And the basic premise that you should be invest­ing where the returns are the best. And if you think about it’s what we do, when we seek, some­one to lis­ten to or some­one to put mon­ey into if we’re look­ing for a farm man­ag­er, we’re look­ing for the per­son with the best return.  So, that’s a kind of return on equi­ty. So, my return on equi­ty as an investor is 19 and a half per­cent over 25 years. And which is basi­cal­ly, the start­ing equi­ty for the yield on any equi­ty minus or start­ing equi­ty and the dif­fer­ence is more increased, which is the return put over the equi­ty, gives a per­cent­age.

So, fun­da­men­tal­ly, we should be putting our mon­ey with the high ROE com­pa­nies, all things being equal. And that’s how I start­ed out invest­ing. But what I found pret­ty quick­ly was, every per­son in the share mar­ket is look­ing for high ROE com­pa­nies, and guess what hap­pens, the price goes up. And so, the high ROE com­pa­nies tend to be the high­er-priced stocks. And if you’re pay­ing too much, even for a real­ly good com­pa­ny, your returns on the price you’ve paid aren’t that great. And I even devel­oped a met­ric that I use for a while called return on pur­chase equi­ty. So basi­cal­ly, if a com­pa­ny was get­ting, 30% return on equi­ty, I had to pay $2, for every dol­lar of equi­ty, when I paid for the share price, then I was­n’t get­ting 30% on the piece of equi­ty I pur­chased it was I was get­ting 15%. And so that’s an impor­tant thing to under­stand that there’s a dif­fer­ence between a good com­pa­ny and a good invest­ment.

So, there are a few things that play out there. And that’s one of the rea­sons why I became a val­ue investor. So, the idea is to find a com­pa­ny that is a high ROE low price, or that you can buy for less than dol­lar equi­ty. So might be sort of medi­um ROE, but you’re pay­ing less than $1 for a dollar’s worth of equi­ty. So, you’re get­ting a bit of a boost on the ROE that you’re get­ting for your pur­chase of equi­ty. Or try­ing to find com­pa­nies where you think the ROE will increase. And that’s part of the process of look­ing at increas­ing equi­ty, and doing the qual­i­ty side of our check­list. So, I don’t use ROE, I’m inter­est­ed in what Andrews say­ing know about the growth of ROE that might be some­thing that we could look at. So, sim­i­lar­ly, I think what Steve Mab said was a met­ric that he was look­ing at, which was growth in gross prof­it per­cent­age, that this growth in ROE per­cent­age might also be worth look­ing at.

So, I’m hap­py to look at that. I would­n’t mind see­ing Andrew’s data if he’s able to sum­ma­rize it and send it through. That’d be great. Thanks, Andrew. And I’m inter­est­ed in how you did your regres­sion because I’ve strug­gled to be able to pull his­tor­i­cal data out of stock doc­tor with­out hav­ing to copy it out by hand. So real­ly inter­est­ed in how you got access to your his­tor­i­cal data. So, if you could at least let me know that and it’d be great. A cou­ple of com­ments on what he said about his find­ings. He say­ing that there was no sig­nif­i­cant cor­re­la­tion between net debt to equi­ty and share price. So, I get that. And I have seen a cor­re­la­tion between increas­ing equi­ty or con­sis­tent­ly increas­ing equi­ty in the share price. And that’s pret­ty log­i­cal to me, if the equi­ty is going up, then the share price should go up as well. All things being equal. So, I’m not sure if that’s what he means there. But cer­tain­ly, we look at net debt to equi­ty as a risk fac­tor. So once the debt gets big, you’d expect the share price to go down because the com­pa­ny would be viewed as risky. So, I’d be inter­est­ed in know­ing what Andrew’s analy­sis was lead­ing him to think there.

Cameron Reil­ly [33:46]: [cross-talk­ing 33:46] inter­rupt for a sec­ond. You say we look at that as a risk fac­tor, is that in the check­list some­where net debt to equi­ty?

Tony Kynas­ton [33:53]: It’s in the check­list if you don’t have a stock doc­tor. Remem­ber we said we look at the quick ratio, the cur­rent ratio, and debt to equi­ty.

Cameron Reil­ly [34:02]: But when we use stock doc­tors, we just take their finan­cial strength.

Tony Kynas­ton [34:06]: So, you would­n’t find a com­pa­ny with a high debt to equi­ty hav­ing any sort of finan­cial strength rat­ing that was high in a stock doc­tor. Or any­body else. A cou­ple of oth­er points about return on equi­ty to be care­ful of because it’s such an impor­tant KPI for busi­ness­es guess what busi­ness­es game it to make them­selves look good. So, one way to increase your ROE, for exam­ple, is to decrease your equi­ty. And one way to do that is to take on more debt. And assets minus lia­bil­i­ties and debt is lia­bil­i­ty gives you equi­ty. So, if you’re increas­ing your lia­bil­i­ties, your equi­ty is going down because the com­pa­ny makes the same prof­it, the ROE goes up because the return put over the equi­ty on a decreas­ing equi­ty num­ber looks bet­ter.

So that’s one thing to be care­ful and some­times com­pa­nies do that. Oth­er tricks they can play us, they might, for exam­ple, under­take what’s called a sale and lease­back pro­gram. So, if it’s, for exam­ple, a super­mar­ket, or a retail chain, or some­body who has lots of bricks and mor­tar assets, then they could sell those assets to a real estate invest­ment trust or a fund that buys assets and then takes the rent. And then they don’t have that those assets any­more. And they have to pay rent on them back to the per­son they bought them. This means their equi­ty goes down and all I’ve done is maybe take on a sort of three to 5% parental lia­bil­i­ty, so maybe their income isn’t affect­ed too much. But there are egos through the roof. So, because they’ve reduced their assets. So, there are a few ways around manip­u­lat­ing ROE. So, in gen­er­al, it’s a very impor­tant met­ric. But be care­ful. It’s not being gained. But yes, Andrew, please send me some more data, par­tic­u­lar­ly about how you got the his­tor­i­cal stock doc­tor data, it would be great to know, and also whether you’re not quite sure, from your com­ments, whether you’re talk­ing about ROE or growth in ROE. So, I’d like to know that too.

Cameron Reil­ly [36:23]: Okay, thank you, Andrew. Chris, hi, cam, I’m won­der­ing whether the VUK score of 0.7 is an out­lier in terms of the typ­i­cal score range? And if so, should it get a greater port­fo­lio allo­ca­tion? As an exam­ple, assum­ing I have 20 stocks in a $200,000 port­fo­lio and a fur­ther $50,000 to spend when it makes sense to put all $50,000 into VUK? I would be inter­est­ed in Tony’s view, gen­er­al­ly on the sig­nif­i­cance of a high score for port­fo­lio allo­ca­tion. Can I take a guess?

Tony Kynas­ton [36:57]: Yes, go for it.

Cameron Reil­ly [36:59]: I would guess that you would say no, because the QAV score at the end of the day, it’s kind of a heuris­tic. We don’t know that a com­pa­ny with a high QAV score is going to out­per­form a com­pa­ny with a low­er QAV score. It may do it should in the­o­ry, but may not always play out that way.

Tony Kynas­ton [37:29]: True, but I think it’s a lit­tle bit broad­er than that. Gen­er­al­ly, I find that things that are high up on the QAV score per­formed bet­ter, but I don’t know where they’re a score of point sev­en, the like­ly UK does would per­form twice as good as a score of point three, five, which is not a stock might have. So, I’m not sure how to wait, the allo­ca­tions. So, you’re right, that it’s more of a quan­tum thing. If it’s above the cut­off, it’s gen­er­al­ly good buy­ing. I always buy from the top down. And that’s that served me well. But I would­n’t allo­cate. I always take equal allo­ca­tions. Because I don’t know if point sev­en is twice as good as point three, five, and there­fore, I would­n’t buy twice as much nec­es­sar­i­ly, I would­n’t know how much more to buy. And point three, five is my point. And it does require fur­ther research on my part. But I’d rather go to Shoal Bay for a few days. So, I’ll add it to the intern list.

Cameron Reil­ly [38:30]: Can you remem­ber what C6C score was when we bought it?

Tony Kynas­ton [38:37]: I think it was towards the bot­tom.

Cameron Reil­ly [38:40]: It was point one six?

Tony Kynas­ton [38:44]: Yes, there you go.

Cameron Reil­ly [38:45]: Hold on no, that’s not right. That was the Coven­try group. Let me see C6C.

Tony Kynas­ton [38:56]: I don’t recall it being near the top Cam. I think it was down the list of [inaudi­ble 39:00].

Cameron Reil­ly [39:05]: Yes. It’s not as easy to find as I thought it would be. Well, it was­n’t very high for mem­o­ry.

Tony Kynas­ton [39:13]: And look at what’s been high on the list recent­ly, Hawthorne resources, for exam­ple, which we just sold so direc­tion­al­ly I think it’s bet­ter off buy­ing from the top down, but I don’t know how much to wait, the top down. So, I buy equal per­cent­ages.

Cameron Reil­ly [39:30]: The way I often think about it is, the QAV score is the result of us sup­ply­ing a fair amount of sci­ence to try and to find com­pa­nies that are per­form­ing well and that are under­val­ued, and then rank­ing those accord­ing to a list of met­rics, but it’s not high sci­ence here. It’s not that much of an accu­rate pre­dic­tion nec­es­sar­i­ly, he said tends to be pret­ty good. But I think it would be a mis­take to think of it as being any­thing more than a clever attempt at guess­ing.

Tony Kynas­ton [40:14]: Well, I’d rather call it sta­tis­tics, we get dou­ble or not, if we buy above this, QAV score. But look, it’s a real­ly good ques­tion. All jokes aside, I should add it to the list of things to research because if we can cor­rect that, how much to allo­cate if there is a cor­re­la­tion between QAV score and it’s an allo­ca­tion in our port­fo­lio that might give us some more out­per­for­mance. So, I haven’t cracked it yet. Just by I guess, liv­ing with it and work­ing with it. But I’m not say­ing it’s not there.

Cameron Reil­ly [40:51]: Okay, here we go. Cop­per Moun­tain Min­ing Cor­po­ra­tion has become a buy­er with a QAV score of point one six, I was right about the point one six.

Tony Kynas­ton [41:03]: And that’s a good point, too, is that we bought Cop­per Moun­tain because of anoth­er fac­tor because the index was going through all the cop­per price was going through a three-point buy peri­od. So, there are oth­er things at play besides just the strike-you QAV score.

Cameron Reil­ly [41:19]: Thank you, Chris. The next ques­tion is from Eric, who was a new sub­scriber and an old school friend of Bret­t’s. So, thank you to Brett for send­ing Eric our way, and wel­come, Eric.

Tony Kynas­ton [41:30]: Yes. Wel­come, Eric. Hi.

Cameron Reil­ly [41:31]: Eric says I do have a ques­tion or maybe a point of dis­cus­sion that I want to put to you and Tony I found in my expe­ri­ence, the break­outs of upper and low­er trend lines are very strong indi­ca­tors of change in sen­ti­ment. This is par­tic­u­lar­ly true in the Forex mar­ket as opposed to the fos­ters mar­ket. That’s not true just in the Forex mar­ket. How­ev­er, I’ve found that trend lines most­ly low­er trend lines when it comes to forex, I think very low socio-eco­nom­ic trend lines in the Forex mar­ket. I found the trend lines can also be self-ful­fill­ing prophe­cies in the cur­ren­cy mar­ket, you can trade long up or short down, which in finan­cial terms is real­ly which cur­ren­cy you’re buy­ing rel­a­tive to the oth­er in the cur­ren­cy pair.

If there’s a well-estab­lished upper trend line trad­er tend to sell or short when it is close, or on the trend line or the train line because they expect it will bounce off the ceil­ing resis­tance. Like­wise, on the low­er trend line traders tend to buy or long as they expect the price to bounce what the call sup­port. If enough traders fol­low this tech­ni­cal analy­sis approach it becomes self-ful­fill­ing and push­es the price back unless one of the big insti­tu­tions decides its val­ue is dif­fer­ent. And mass trades push­ing the price through the line and past it, cre­at­ing a new sen­ti­ment. I note in T K’s process that if the price touch­es or just goes above the upper three-point trend line just a lit­tle it is high­light­ed as a buy, there is a risk that the price could bounce back down due to the behav­ior I described above.

Would­n’t it be bet­ter, less risk to call it a buy once the trend line break is con­firmed? Maybe five to 10% of the five-year price range dif­fer­ence could be used as a buffer. For exam­ple, if a stock trad­ed between $15 and a five year high to $5 at a five-year low then the range is $10. So, 5% is 50 cents, call it a buy if the price breaks above the trend line by a mar­gin of 50 cents. We’d like to hear your thoughts kind regards, Eric. And I point­ed out to Eric that there have been sev­er­al instances where we bought some­thing when it’s picked it head up or Ground­hog Day-style and then you know pulled it back in and decid­ed we were up for anoth­er six weeks of the win­ner. What do you think Eric’s ratio­nale, Tony?

Tony Kynas­ton [43:52]: I think it’s quite use­ful. I’m not sure if the Forex mar­ket works the same as the stock mar­ket. My expe­ri­ences that gen­er­al­ly when some­thing breaks through the trend­line it keeps going which might be dif­fer­ent for the cur­ren­cy mar­ket is prob­a­bly not this plays in the cur­ren­cy mar­ket. I don’t have a prob­lem if peo­ple want to wait for 5% above the buy line, I would­n’t do it on a cell line because I think often­times what I’ve seen is when the price goes through the cell line it just drops and it keeps going quick­ly so you could get caught and you’re wait­ing for a 5% below the sell line but then it went down 20 or 30% before you had a chance to sell it and you’re sell­ing push it down. So, that’s some­thing I would­n’t do I’d rather on cau­tion on the side of cau­tion on the sell list and sell straight­away. On the buy list I think I still would do that as well because you know this is if you think about the stocks, this is some­thing that which we like to do has a QAV score which is wor­thy of buy­ing it.

And it’s prob­a­bly been going up any­way before it cross­es its byline. Almost by def­i­n­i­tion, it has to do that. And so, we’ve already seen the estab­lish­ment of a trend. So, once it cross­es that line, I’m still a firm buy­er in that mar­ket. I agree it can retrace. And if you wait for five or 10%, you might be even more cer­tain that the uptrend but you’ve also lost 10% of the upside. So, giv­en that it’s caused well, for us, it’s in an uptrend, we’re just wait­ing for the con­fir­ma­tion, which is to go above the byline, then I’m still hap­py buy­ing when it cross­es, looks, the whole field of what’s called tech­ni­cal analy­sis, which a sep­a­rate sec­tion of which was just described by Eric about trend lines and resis­tance and sup­port. And there’s a whole heap of oth­er things about triple peaks and mov­ing shoul­ders, and Dow The­o­ry and oscil­la­tions and all sorts of things. It’s a whole chap­ter of invest­ing by itself, but I’ll cut it short for you, it does­n’t work.

It’s my expe­ri­ence with it. It’s almost a pseu­do-sci­ence and that’s why I try and use this share price graph as spar­ing­ly as I can, and as broad away as I can, as sim­ply as I can, just to try and con­firm sen­ti­ment one way or the oth­er, and not try and make any sort of more intel­li­gent guess­es than that based on what the share price is doing. Because after all, it just lines on the graph. It’s that’s the QAV score, it’s impor­tant. And we want to make sure that peo­ple are out there buy­ing some­thing that we want to buy because that push­es the share price up. And if they’re sell­ing it, then we want to be added as well. And so, we need to put some rules around that. But I try and keep it as sim­ple as pos­si­ble. Because I know you don’t think it’s sim­ple. But believe me, it is as sim­ple as pos­si­ble.

Cameron Reil­ly [47:03]: Tony Kynas­ton — it just does­n’t work. I’ll sum­ma­rize it for you. It just does­n’t work.

Tony Kynas­ton [47:13]: I’ve looked at tech­ni­cal analy­sis, read lots of books, fol­lowed peo­ple. They call chartists. And they go into real­ly deep, deep dives around what the share price graph is doing. But gen­er­al­ly, I find to take the macro view and keep it as sim­ple as pos­si­ble.

Cameron Reil­ly [47:31]: Steven Mori­ar­ty will be com­ing after you, Tony. Does­n’t work. What right?

Tony Kynas­ton [47:40]: I don’t think Steven was a tech­ni­cal ana­lyst but any­way.

Cameron Reil­ly [47:44]: No, you just say­ing stuff does­n’t work. That’s what got you into trou­ble.

Tony Kynas­ton [47:50]: Any­one wants to come on to the debate me I’ll be hap­py to have that debate. But be pre­pared.

Cameron Reil­ly [48:06]: Some­body sent me a thing about PEs, but I don’t know who it was. Oh, I don’t have a name in there. Hold on. Let me see if I can find this email.

Tony Kynas­ton [48:15]: You’re right. There’s no name in there.

Cameron Reil­ly [48:20]: Brett. This is Brett. Eric’s friend, Brett.

Tony Kynas­ton [48:24]: All right. So, Brett had two ques­tions this week. But he gave one to Eric. Did he? Get around our one ques­tion rule.

Cameron Reil­ly [48:31]: Yes. Well, that’s how you do it. If you want to get around the one ques­tion rule, sign up for free to get them to ask the oth­er ques­tion. This is from Brett. These relate to the man­u­al­ly entered scores for record low six PEs and con­sis­tent­ly increas­ing equi­ty using stock doc­tors as the source. He’s got three ques­tions in here. So, he should have signed up two oth­er friends and split it up, come on Brett, what are you doing? Num­ber one, there will often be a col­umn called lat­est, which is nor­mal­ly after the last report­ing peri­od. Is this the last report­ed val­ue adjust­ed with the cur­rent share price? Does TK con­sid­er it for the man­u­al­ly entered scores?

Tony Kynas­ton [49:15]: I do I take the low­er of the light­est or the last results. As the PE that we use to test.

Cameron Reil­ly [49:24]: Sor­ry. But I can’t ask the oth­er two ques­tions. Brett. You got to sign up some more friends and get them to ask them for you.

Tony Kynas­ton [49:31]: No, the rea­son I do that is that if the share price is going down, the PE gets bet­ter. So, I use the light­est. If the share price is going up. I use the last results one just because I don’t want to nec­es­sar­i­ly pun­ish a com­pa­ny if the share price is increas­ing, which is a good thing for us.

Cameron Reil­ly [49:50]: Part Two of Bret­t’s ques­tion.

Tony Kynas­ton [49:53]: There’s a part two. It’s a stream of con­scious­ness ques­tion. all one big ques­tion.

Cameron Reil­ly [49:59]: I think when you rec­om­mend Eric to QAV, you get to ask a three-part ques­tion. That’s his reward. I often see NA for PE, how does Tony treat these when either the cur­rent PE is miss­ing or the pre­vi­ous PEs or miss­ing does he ignore them or auto­mat­i­cal­ly score a zero or a neg­a­tive one,

Tony Kynas­ton [50:20]: I ignore them. So, for exam­ple, if a com­pa­ny was list­ed 18 months ago, we get three PEs. And if we have noth­ing before that, I just take the three PEs. If the cur­rent PE or the lat­est results, PE, whichev­er is low­er is the low­est for those three peri­ods, it gets a score of one or two, I think four PE isn’t its low­est and the six is two. And like­wise, some­times com­pa­nies fall into a loss-mak­ing sit­u­a­tion. So, you might find that there’s an NA, you might have PEs for some parts of the peri­od, and then noth­ing, and then they restart again. Again, I just ignore the noth­ings. And look for the low­est in that range of the oth­er three or four what­ev­er’s there.

Cameron Reil­ly [51:04]: Part Three for con­sis­tent­ly increas­ing equi­ty. Does this mean each report must be greater than the pre­vi­ous? Or are we look­ing for good trend exam­ples? WBC and BRI, both had one report in the last six where it went down.

Tony Kynas­ton [51:20]: I’m look­ing for every six months going up. But I take Bret­t’s point, some­times I’ve want­ed to fudge it myself. And in the case of West­pac bank, where you see it just might have gone neg­a­tive for one half, and you think, there’s still a good com­pa­ny, they can prob­a­bly get a score, but now I tend to just look for those which are con­tin­u­ous­ly going up. And we want com­pa­nies that are resilient and have good man­age­ment. So that’s why I do that. But again, I think that’s prob­a­bly a ques­tion for regres­sion test­ing to com­pare both of those options.

Cameron Reil­ly [51:59]: Thanks, Brett. Hope that helps. Okay, now we get to the BOQ ques­tions. I think this was ini­tial­ly post­ed by Petra, and then Ben jumped on as well. So, Petra bought BOQ, and then they end­ed up in a trad­ing halt. When they were announc­ing the whole ama acqui­si­tion. She said, hap­pi­ly, the now trend­ing up, which is just begin­ner’s luck. No, not real­ly. [cross-talk­ing 52:28] week. I would like a dis­cus­sion on what to do about the extra share offer they’ll be put to share­hold­ers and per­haps how these things might end up. I know, we just mon­i­tor cell lines, but I’m just curi­ous, par­tic­u­lar­ly about the out­come of shared delu­sions. Does Tony watch for some news a lit­tle more close­ly when this hap­pens to a hold­ing he has?

Tony Kynas­ton [52:52]: Good ques­tion. So yes, I do watch for sen­ti­ment and I do read arti­cles that I come across about it. And I’ve read a cou­ple about the EMI acqui­si­tion and I think it’s mak­ing a fair bit of sense for Bank of Queens­land to diver­si­fy its cus­tomer base away from Queens­land, EMI’s got a lot of Vic­to­ri­an cus­tomers. And also, they bring on a lot of retail lend­ing cus­tomers, which helps us to skew the mix of the bank of Queens­land’s loan book back towards retail, which is good. So, there are some con­vinc­ing argu­ments to do it, the ques­tion will come down to price because they’re rais­ing a lot of mon­ey to pay for it. Now, they come out of a trad­ing halt tomor­row, and we’re record­ing this on the 24th of Feb­ru­ary. So, we’ll know pret­ty quick­ly which way the mar­kets going on this one.

That’ll be a big guide for me. But basi­cal­ly, my rule of thumb for this kind of sit­u­a­tion is that they’ll put out a doc­u­ment which allows retail share­hold­ers to take up the offer of buy­ing new shares in the com­pa­ny at a par­tic­u­lar price, that price has to be less than what the share price is. And usu­al­ly by sort of a rea­son­able amount to rep­re­sent the dilu­tion that you’ll have in the shares. There aren’t issues so more shares are an issue, your share of the earn­ings of the com­pa­ny goes down a lit­tle bit. So, you want to buy in at a low­er price to reflect that. It’s up to you whether you want to try and put togeth­er a com­bined me Bank of Queens­land pro for­ma report and then run it through the QAV check­list and decide whether you want to take up the rights or not. Again, I’d rather go to law and or to show by and have a hol­i­day. The offer doc­u­ment for the retail and title will con­tain a pro for­ma set of accounts and that’s usu­al­ly a pret­ty good one.

So, you can run those num­bers through the QAV check­list and see if the merged com­pa­ny is a good one in terms of the QAV process. I’ve done that occa­sion­al­ly, if I’m a lit­tle bit wor­ried about the acqui­si­tion at this stage, I’m not, I might get wor­ried about it if the sen­ti­ment, starts to go down dra­mat­i­cal­ly. Tomor­row when it relists, but I don’t nec­es­sar­i­ly expect that. So, the process I nor­mal­ly adopt is if the retail enti­tle­ment allows me to make a lit­tle bit of mon­ey because it’s, I’m being offered shares in the com­pa­ny at a low­er price than the share price. I’ll take it up. And then I’ll watch sen­ti­ment and see if we get a three-point scale. And I’ll wait until the next results come out. Which is the next check­point for decid­ing on the com­pa­ny.

Cameron Reil­ly [55:53]: So, it’s does­n’t come out of a trad­ing halt until the 25th of Feb­ru­ary. But when I look at the chart, it sorts of went sort of flat­line there for a cou­ple of days at $8.16. And then it spiked up to $9.10. If it’s been in a trad­ing halt, what caused the share price to jump up?

Tony Kynas­ton [56:15]: I don’t know. I have to have a look. Sor­ry. It should­n’t be. Let me just have a quick look.

Cameron Reil­ly [56:22]: On the 18th went into a trad­ing halt. And it was $8.10 by 16 some­thing like that.

Tony Kynas­ton [56:33]: Nine. Okay, you’re look­ing at the front share price graph and stock doc­tor?

Cameron Reil­ly [56:40]: Yes.

Tony Kynas­ton [56:41]: That’s a week­ly one. So, it was ris­ing, prob­a­bly on the back of its results, as at the week­end, the week end­ing the 19th. So, it was in a trad­ing halt. The clos­ing price then was $8.16 and it’s cur­rent­ly at $9.11. So, I can’t explain why it goes up. It should­n’t. That’s inter­est­ing, isn’t it?

Cameron Reil­ly [57:07]: Mag­ic stuff going on behind these things.

Tony Kynas­ton [57:08]:  Yes. Mag­ic stuff, that’s right.

Cameron Reil­ly [57:11]: Well, Ben had a fol­low-up ques­tion. He says I bought BOQ about the same time. As Petra, it looks like a pret­ty good val­ue deal only pay­ing about 1.05 times book val­ue. If I’m read­ing the announce­ment cor­rect­ly, I’d be inter­est­ed in Tony’s thoughts on how this affects the val­u­a­tion slash QAV score of Bo Q. Well, I guess he just sort of han­dled all of that.

Tony Kynas­ton [57:33]: So, if they’re pay­ing $1.05 of EMI bank book val­ue, then it won’t affect it at all. It will be the same. But that’s my point you need to look at the pro for­ma doc­u­ments. So, don’t launch when they give you the offer doc­u­ment to buy more shares and see if that’s the case.

Cameron Reil­ly [57:52]: Okay, thanks, Ben. Thanks, Petra. Alright, home­stretch James. Hi, Cam and Tony. I have MXI. I’m sor­ry, James. Go see a doc­tor about that. I think there’s a cream top­i­cal cream. You have to wear gloves but burn the gloves after­ward. What­ev­er you do, don’t touch any­one. No, sor­ry. keeps going. I have MXI as a buy now as it appears to no longer have a qual­i­fied audit on the lat­est finan­cials.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:27]: I had a look at that. Looks like it’s the same thing for me. I know that it’s dropped 6.4% today.

Cameron Reil­ly [58:39]: MXI is maxi pads. No Massey trains indus­tries. Yes, okay. So, they had a qual­i­fied order, but now they don’t.

Tony Kynas­ton [58:51]: So, it looks like, bear­ing in mind, it’s a half-year­ly report that we get. And the audi­tors do say that it’s not an audit. It’s just a review of the finan­cials. When I see this hap­pen like that, I’d say it’s not a qual­i­fied audit. So, I took it off the list, but if you look at the share price, it’s when its upward trad­ing. It’s a falling knife it’s going upwards through a buy and sell peri­od.

Cameron Reil­ly [59:21]: Falling knife that’s going upwards.

Tony Kynas­ton [59:24]: So riv­ing knife. What do we call them a ris­ing Schro­ding­er bun­ny boil­er?

Cameron Reil­ly [59:31]: Bun­ny boil­er. Well, let me do a chart.

Tony Kynas­ton [59:36]: So, it was a buy­back towards the end of last year around sort of Sep­tem­ber. But it had a qual­i­fied audit. So, we did­n’t buy it. It’s just nudged over the cell line in Jan­u­ary and now it’s sort of start­ing to rise again. So, It’s the trend is upwards. But it’s cross­ing its buy­ing cell line as it goes.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:00:03]: It’s still below the cell line.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:00:07]: It’s still below the cell line.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:00:09]: Would you say?

Tony Kynas­ton [1:00:11]: No, I think it’s above the cell line today.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:00:13]: Well, if you take the low point is into May, and then the end of June is the next low point.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:00:20]: No, I’ve got the end of June 2020 is the low point.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:00:25]: End of June? Mine says it’s the 1st of June.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:00:29]: 30th of June 2020.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:00:32]: Sor­ry. Okay, 1st of June. You see that lit­tle red graph under­neath it says the first of June and I don’t know why does it say the first of June down below there? So, that’s where it starts. Okay. My bad. Okay, so that’s the low point 30th of June then the next one is the 31st of July, right?

Tony Kynas­ton [1:00:47]: Cor­rect. Yes.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:00:48]: It’s going to be below that line.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:00:51]: No, is it below, yes. It’s just touch­ing it, I think.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:00:57]: You’re just touch­ing it. Get your hand off it, no what?

Tony Kynas­ton [1:01:05]: It has dropped six and a half per­cent today so maybe when I had to look at it before it was above it, but it is hug­ging that so the upward sell on. It’s in an uptrend but it’s hug­ging the cell line.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:01:19]: So, bun­ny boil­er mean­ing too dan­ger­ous, looks sexy. But oth­er stocks are just as sexy that isn’t sleep­ing, don’t bring a knife to bed and slide it under the mat­tress.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:01:41]: Don’t bring an ice pick to bed. I think it’s an upward trend although it’s down 6% today and it’s kind of ceas­es on its way up. So, watch­ing say I think prob­a­bly.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:01:54]: All right, James. Good luck with that cream. Let us know how it goes. Mark. Hi, Cam just won­der­ing if Tony can please explain. The MQG Cap­i­tal notes five rais­es on the show. I tried to read up on this today. And I went not too hard. Cory group lim­it­ed cap­i­tal notes five.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:02:15]: So, I guess, Mark is like me, I’ve received the email from the Mac­quar­ie group dur­ing the week say­ing that they’re issu­ing cap­i­tal notes. And did I want to take any out? This is done, par­tic­u­lar­ly by banks, or that does­n’t have to be just done by the bank. But basi­cal­ly, what we’re talk­ing about is a bond. And some­times they’re called hybrids because they do have slight­ly dif­fer­ent char­ac­ter­is­tics from a bond that say issued by a gov­ern­ment where you put $100 in buy the bond, the gov­ern­ment pays you a pre­mi­um every year, and then say 10 years if it’s a 10-year bond, the gov­ern­ment gives you $100 back and you’ve had the ben­e­fit of get­ting the yield every year.

So, in this case, it’s a cor­po­rate bond and the Mac­quar­ie Group is giv­ing you the same sort of deal. So, you buy the Mac­quar­ie note, in this case, it’s the fifth time they’ve done it in recent mem­o­ry. So, Mac­quar­ie note num­ber five, it’s a bond. The dif­fer­ence with this and why these notes is some­times called hybrids rather than bonds is because the Mac­quar­ie group has the right to con­vert these into shares, as a way of redeem­ing them. And if it’s not a bad prospec­tus, I found it rea­son­ably easy to read. But in sum­ma­ry, it’s right up at the start of the prospec­tus, but this par­tic­u­lar offer­ing is a ful­ly paid, unse­cured, sub­or­di­nat­ed, non-cumu­la­tive manda­to­ri­ly con­vert­ible note, what all that means, is that you have to pay all the mon­ey upfront, you can’t do it in install­ments, it’s unse­cured.

So, that means that if the Mac­quar­ie group ever goes into bank­rupt­cy, you’re ranked below or secured cred­i­tors, which does mean you’re ranked above the share­hold­ers, share­hold­ers are always lost, which is a bit of a shame, but they are. You’re ranked above them, but low­er than the secured share­hold­ers and CSR secured cred­i­tors. Because essen­tial­ly, what you’re doing is you’re loan­ing your $100 per note to Mac­quar­ie Bank for the peri­od. And there are sev­er­al dif­fer­ent redemp­tion dates for this and they’re all depen­dent on when Mac­quar­ie wants to do it, you can’t redeem the note for the cash­back or shares. But Mac­quar­ie can redeem them for $100 of shares in 2030. And there’s a cou­ple of oth­er dates ear­li­er where they can give you the $100 back as cash, I think in 2028, from mem­o­ry. So, it’s up to them. So that’s impor­tant to know. It’s non-cumu­la­tive. So, what that means is if they miss a div­i­dend pay­ment, bad luck, you don’t get to the fol­low­ing year.

And that’s pret­ty unin­sured, which means that, well, if you put $100 into a retail bank, the gov­ern­ment ensures that mon­ey for you. And so, if the bank goes broke, the gov­ern­ment gives you $100 back. But this is not the case with Mac­quar­ie groups, they’re just mak­ing a depen­dent liq­uid. So, it’s a type of bond, it will pay a yield and these types of offer­ings are always direc­tor that’s retirees who can’t get a decent income from putting their mon­ey in the bank. In this case, the yield isn’t that great. It’s 2.9% above the ref­er­ence rate.

So, the ref­er­ence rate can float in this case, the ref­er­ence rate is what’s called the BB SW. Bank Bill Swap Rate from mem­o­ry. It’s a rate that struck between the banks if they want to lend mon­ey to each oth­er, which they some­times do from time to time, often­times just to shore up short-term oblig­a­tions. But the BB SW is cur­rent­ly just a smidgen over point 01 per­cent. So, it’s bug­ger all. So, you’re get­ting 2.91% if you give them a query of $100 for this note, and you don’t know when it’s going to be redeemed because they’ll redeem it on your behalf manda­to­ri­ly either for cash and 2028 or for $100 worth of work it’s $101 worth of McQuar­rie shares in 2030.

The ben­e­fit you’ve got on this par­tic­u­lar note is it’s going to be list­ed on the ASX so it’s trad­able. So, if inter­est rates sud­den­ly go up, your note becomes more valu­able. And so, you can sell it for more than $100. Depend­ing on you know how high the inter­est rate goes up. But what you don’t get is eight to 10 years’ worth of improve­ment in the Mac­quar­ie group share price, or if it goes back­ward, you don’t get the loss either. So, it’s a prod­uct that is geared towards retirees. I’ve nev­er bought any of these types of prod­ucts hybrids or all these kinds of cor­po­rate bonds because I don’t need the high­er yield.

And just to be clear, the yield on the Mac­quar­ie group at the moment is 2.16% as of the 24th of Feb­ru­ary, so you’re get­ting an extra what’s that 7.74 three quar­ters of a per­cent. If you buy this note, and you don’t get any cap­i­tal growth then that’s reflect­ed in the growth of the Mac­quar­ie group share price, which is plen­ty of bias at the moment. So, it’s not some­thing I’m inter­est­ed in. And this is not finan­cial advice. So, if you’re some­one who is look­ing for a bit of extra yield that might suit you, but you know, read the prospec­tus and do your finan­cial analy­sis. But that’s a sum­ma­ry it’s a bond with some spe­cial char­ac­ter­is­tics which are all con­trolled by Mac­quar­ie as to how it’s redeemed.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:08:00]: In the words of the may­or of Col­orado city in Texas get off your ass and do your work and stop expect­ing a hand­out. The strong will sur­vive and the weak will per­ish.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:08:12]: If you won’t pal get on your bike and ped­al hook it up to the heat­ing.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:08:20]: The fun­ny thing about this cap­i­tal notes five raise is it describes my mar­riage quite well. ful­ly paid, unse­cured, sub­or­di­nat­ed non-cumu­la­tive manda­to­ri­ly con­vert­ible.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:08:34]: So, should I just call it the Mac­quar­ie Cuck notes from now?

Cameron Reil­ly [1:08:46]: That’s anoth­er cof­fee mug, cuck notes, should be the title of this week’s episode. Final­ly, and I squeezed this one in for Dave because we went back­ward and for­wards about this on Face­book today. Hi, Cam and TK just been read­ing the acquir­ers mul­ti­ple about rever­sion to the mean TK have you ever done a check­list to see when stocks in your port­fo­lio become over­val­ued? So, you could sell and put cap­i­tal into the under­val­ued ones Dave?

Tony Kynas­ton [1:09:17]: I haven’t done a par­tic­u­lar regres­sion analy­sis on it but as you know, I hold them until they become a three-point sell. So, that’s my way of know­ing that they’re over­val­ued and com­ing down in price. Because what I found is that shares all the time go off the bot­tom of our buy­er list because the price is improv­ing. But the com­pa­ny is still just as good in terms of its qual­i­ty met­rics and now it’s got oth­er peo­ple inter­est­ed in their buy­ing it too so I don’t sell when it comes off the buy list. And I’ve held chairs for sev­er­al years that keep going up. And so, to have sold out of those and short sell­ing out of those and buy­ing into some­thing else on the buy­ers may have giv­en me the same Return. But I’m hap­py to keep hold­ing on to a share, low­er the volatil­i­ty, my port­fo­lio and avoid trans­ac­tion costs and still get a decent return by hold­ing them until I become a sell.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:10:13]: I said to Dave on Face­book when this sub­ject comes up, Tony often quotes Buf­fett, when car­ried out capa­bly, an invest­ment strat­e­gy of that type will often result in its prac­ti­tion­er own­ing a few secu­ri­ties, that will come to rep­re­sent a very large por­tion of his port­fo­lio. This investor would get a sim­i­lar result if you fol­lowed a pol­i­cy of pur­chas­ing an inter­est in say 20% of the future earn­ings of sev­er­al out­stand­ing col­lege bas­ket­ball stars. A hand­ful of these would go on to achieve NBA star­dom, and the investors take from them would soon dom­i­nate his roy­al­ty stream. To sug­gest that this investor should sell off por­tions of his most suc­cess­ful invest­ments, sim­ply because they’ve come to dom­i­nate his port­fo­lio is akin to sug­gest­ing that the balls trade Michael Jor­dan because he has become so impor­tant to the team.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:11:01]: Why would you? But I under­stand. Dav­e’s point here he’s say­ing that, are we get­ting a bet­ter return at the start when some­thing is under­val­ued and the stan­dard trend up? Or are we get­ting a bet­ter return along the way, and gen­er­al­ly, I find you get the same return along the way.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:11:18]: I said to Dave, if you look at FMG as an exam­ple, it’s up 220% since we bought it if we’d sold it at 100 and 100%. We would have lost the next 120%. Not many stocks in our port­fo­lio. I think there’s maybe two done bet­ter than 120% in the last year. But then Dave right­ly point­ed out, yes, but FMG still scores well on the QAV met­rics. So, it has­n’t revert­ed past the mean. So, it’s a keep­er. But one day will not score well. But I think your point is that just because they don’t score well, does­n’t mean they’re not going to keep doing well.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:11:53]: Well, just because they drop off at the bot­tom of the buy­er list, it’s usu­al­ly because their share price is going up. And that’s a good thing. I think what Dave say­ing is if it dis­ap­pears off the buy­er list should we sell it then because there are things on the buy list that we could, allo­cate the mon­ey to, and there’s an oppor­tu­ni­ty cost there. But it’s my expe­ri­ence that if you hold them the good com­pa­nies just keep going. And I’ll use the three-point trend line sell to two sells rather than when it comes off the buy list.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:12:31]: All right. Thanks, Dave. I hope that helps. Thank you, every­body. That’s a wrap for this week. Tony, what have you got on for the rest of the week? Are you plan­ning any more hol­i­days, vaca­tions?

Tony Kynas­ton [1:12:42]: No more hol­i­days, hope­ful­ly, you’re get­ting a golf­ing tomor­row that will that’s been pret­ty wet in Syd­ney. A cou­ple of din­ners lined up. I’ve got some horse rac­ing on the week­end hors­es rac­ing on the week­end. So, I don’t know if this goes out in time, but [inaudi­ble 1:12:55] is rac­ing in Mel­bourne, and Princess raf­fles, which is a horse we brain is rac­ing in South Aus­tralia and Mur­ray Bridge, both in good races too. So, fin­gers crossed, we might get a good result.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:13:09]: Well, good luck with that. I’ll put a few bucks on yet again and see, even­tu­al­ly.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:13:19]: It’ll regress to the mean.

Cameron Reil­ly [1:13:23]: Exact­ly. My bank account is regress­ing [cross-talk­ing 1:13:28] of zero, which is where it’s been for the last 20 years. You try­ing to regress my bank account back to zero. Well, that’s good. Good luck with that. And enjoy the rest of your week, Tony, and take care of every­one.

Tony Kynas­ton [1:13:44]: All right. Thanks, Cam

 

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